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SOME CORPORATE ANllJ) SlECUJPUTIES LA ~V 
PJER§JPECT1IVES ON STIJIDENT-A lf'ltiJLETES 
AND 111DE NCl~A 
D AVID A. SKEEL, JR . ~ 
Since its inception in 1905 as a response to the growing violence in 
college football, the National Collegiate Ao'1letic Association (NCAA) has 
expanded its oversight to nearly every sport at nearly every college and 
university. In keeping with its stated goal of protect ing ainateur athletics 
at the university level, the NCAA prescribes and enforces regulations on 
issues ranging from recruitment and compensation of college athletes to 
the format for championship tournaments. 1 
The NCAA's vast authority over college athletics raises obvious 
questions of accountability. Who, we might ask, is responsible for 
overseeing the way that the NCAA a11d its member institutions oversee 
college athletics, and for ensuring that t.he regulatory apparatus is fair and 
effective for the various constituencies who participate in or are affected 
by college sports? The answer is far from clear. Student-athletes and 
universities with grievances most frequently challenge the NCAA on 
constitutional and related grounds, often arguing that the NCAA imposed 
penalties on them without adequate due process. These suits do not seem 
particularly promising, however, as courts have tended to show broad 
deference to NCAA procedures .2 
* Associate Professor of Law, Temple University . I would like to thank Sue 
Ehrmann, Will Anzenberger, and the Wisconsin Law Review for inviting me to participate 
in this symposium; Jane Baron, Peter Carstensen, Deborah DeMott, JoAnne Epps, Nancy 
Knauer, Paul Olszowka, Robert Reinstein , Joel Seligman, Max Stearns and participants 
at the conference held in connection with this symposium and at a faculty colloquium at 
Temple University School of Law for helpful comments on earlier drafts; and Christine 
Taran for excellent research assistance. 
1. Much of the NCAA's regulatory framework is codified in the NCAA Mamtal, 
which contains the NCAA's constitution, its operating bylaws, and its administrative 
regulations. For a helpful discussion of the history and current structure of the NCAA, 
see Rodney K. Smith, The National Collegiate Azhletic Association 's Death Penalty: How 
Educators Punish Themselves and Others, 62 IND. L .J. 985 (1987). 
2. For instance, in a high-profile Supreme Court decision involving Jerry 
Tarkanian, the former men's basketball coach at the University of Nevada-Las Vegas, the 
Supreme Court rejected Tarkanian's due process challenge to the NCAA's disciplinary 
actions against him and his program. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 454 (1988). The 
one prominent suit the NCAA did lose was an antitrust challenge to its regulation of 
college football television rights . N C/\.J\ v. Board of Regents, 462 U.S. 1311 (1983). 
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The goal of this Article is to look in a very different 
direction-corporate and securities lRw-a:nd consider whether any of the 
accountability devices used in that context might provide an effective 
means of policing intercollegiate athletics . In keeping with the tt1eme of 
this symposium, I will focus in particular on student-athletes. Thus, the 
question I ask throughout L~e Article is whether one or more corporate or 
securities law strategies might give student-athletes a greater say in, or 
more effective protection with respect to , NCAA decisionrna.'dng.3 
Many of the most frequent criticisms of the NCAA and its member 
inst itutions relate to their treatment of student-att'Jletes who parti cipate in 
the most prominent revenue sports, Division J-A football and men's 
Dlv~sion I basketbalL Despit~ the vast amount of income these sports 
bring in, the NCAA prohibits a university from paying its student-
athletes, and strictly regulates student-athletes' ability to transfer or to hire 
an agent during their college careers. Critics of these regulations point 
out that the member universities that run t'le NCAA have perverse 
incentives when it comes to considering the effect the regulations have on 
student-athletes, since t1e universities themselves derive a direct financial 
benefit from limiting student-athlete compensation and restricting 
mobility . In their preoccupation with develop ing successful football and 
basketball programs, NCAA member institutions may also fail to pay 
sufficient attention to whether student-athletes receive an adequate 
education during their college careers . 
This brief description might seem to suggest that student-athletes 
have a discrete set of interests that may be subverted by the NCAA 
decisionmaking process. Yet even within the limited context of revenue-
producing sports, student-athlete interests are far from uniform. While 
the limits on compensation seem to penal ize the very best football and 
basketball players, for instance, other athletes may actually benefit if 
restrict ions on marketable players leave more money for granting 
scholarships and related support to those who are not among the very best 
aih1etes . The NCAA.'s obligation to promote education as a key element 
of amateurism raises equally difficult issues. Who is to say whether an 
aspiring football player's belief tl,.at rais ing the NCAA's minimum 
academic sta_i1dards \vouid jeopardize his prospects for a pro career, or 
3. Since t.he symposium's focus is on student-athletes , my analysis of NCAA 
decisionmaking considers the student-athlete ' s relationship with her univers ity as well. 
In fact, several of the papers presented at the conference argue that fo r meaningful change 
to occur, much of it must take place at the university level. See John R. Allison, Rule-
Making Accuracy in the NCAA and lts Member Institutions: Do Their Decisional 
Structures and Process Promote Educatiorwl Primacy for the Student-Athlete?, 44 K.AN. 
L. REv. (forthcoming 1995); Ti..'llothy Davis, A Model of lnslitutiona l Governan.cefor 
intercollegiate Athletics, 1995 WIS. L. REV . 599. 
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NCAA decisionmakers' parentalistic desire to force high school athletes 
to focus on academics, should be seen as the appropriate student-athlete 
"interest" to consider? The multiplicity of student-athlete perspectives 
becomes still more striking when we take into account gender equity 
issues, or the differences between student-athletes at Division I schools 
and those at smal ler institutions. 4 
However problematic it is to speak of student-athletes as if their 
interests were consistent and well-defined, one th ing is d ear. NCAA &'1d 
member institution decisionmakers have traditionally been the only actors 
with authority to determine what is best for everyone involved in 
intercollegiate athletics, including student-athletes. The l'ICAA has taken 
a few steps to give student-athletes more of a voice, such as providing for 
student advisory committees. 5 Yet the steps are extremely tentative thus 
far. It may therefore be an opportune time to consider whet.~er a~.1other 
perspective, such as corporate law, might provide new insight on the 
relationship between student-athletes and the NCAA. 
Corporate and securities law can be seen as offering two distinct 
approaches that one might employ on behalf of student-athletes. The first 
focuses on what I will describe as "internal" corporate governance, and 
includes governance devices such as board representation and litigation to 
enforce fiduciary duties. According to this view, adding student-athlete 
representatives to the NCAA's primary decisionmaking bodies might 
enable student-athletes to voice their concerns directly. In the alternative, 
if NCAA and member institution decisionmakers' fiduciary duties 
included a duty to student-athletes, student-athletes could sue to enforce 
this duty, and the prospect of such suits might force the decisionmakers 
to articulate more clearly their own views on the NCAA and member 
institutions' obligations to student-athletes. 
The arguments that student-athletes should be given direct 
representation, and that the NCAA and its member universities owe a 
duty to student-athletes, bear a close resemblance to a longstanding debate 
in the for-profit context over corporate directors' accountability. 6 
4. The distinction between Division I and other schools is significantly dramatic 
to support a strong argument for bifurcating their regulation completely. For a discussion 
of the incomplete distinctions made in the current decisionmaking framework, see Allison, 
supra note 3. 
5. At the 1.995 Convention in January, the NCAA membership passed a measure 
adding student-athlete advisors to five NCAA committees. See Jack L. Copeland, 
Student-Athlete Welfare Principles Ovenvhebningly Adopted, N C.i'\.'\ NEWS , Jan. 11, 1995, 
at 7. i discuss this and related measures in Part H. 
6. The debate is usually traced back to an exchange between Adolph Berle, who 
argued that directors should focus on shareholders' interests , and Merrick Dodd, who 
argued that the directors should also consider interests of employees and other 
constituencies. See generally Adoiph Berle, Corporate Powers os Powers Held in Trust, 
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Although corporate law hc>,s trad itional ly held that directors are 
responsible solely to shareholders, and that directors should work to 
ma;dmize the value of shareholders ' stock, a chorus of dissenting voices 
has consistently cal led for a fiduciary duty to, or board representation of, 
other constituencies such as employees, consumers and local 
communities. 7 
Just a.s for-profit directors have trad itionally ma.ilaged with their 
shareholders in mind, t'"Je NCAA is run by and for its member institutions 
rather tha.'1 for student-athletes. From this perspective, student-athlete 
representation would entail an expansion of the NCAA's focus quite 
similar to adding employe.~ o:r consumer representatives to a fo r-profit 
corporation board. Yet the case for student-athlete representation in the 
NCAA is in many respects far more compelling u'1an the arguments for 
adding nonshareholder representatives to L.l-;e boards of for-profit 
corporations. Moreover , whereas most for-profits do not include multiple 
constituencies on the board , nonprofi t corporations such as nonprofit 
hospitals, charities and some univers it ies do include representatives of 
designated interests. As in ot..her for-profit and nonprofit contexts , both 
d irect representation and fiduc iary duty litigation suffer from significant 
shortcomings as sources of NCAA accountability. Yet both offer some 
promise, and the fiduciary duty approach in particular may improve on 
what currently exists. 
The second general approach to NCAA accountability would be to 
establish a framework for external review. The antitrust laws already 
serve as one source of external review of NCAA decisionmaking. I focus 
in this Article on another possible model, a framework drawn from the 
Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) regulation of the stock 
exchanges . 8 The heart of this fr amework is a system of dual regulation: 
the exchange registers as a "self-regulatory organization" and ordinarily 
governs itself in the first instance, but the SEC retains broad authority to 
work with or unilateral ly regulate the exchange in appropriate 
circumsta.'lces . Although at first glance the NCAA seems to have little 
44 HARV. L. REv. 1049 (1931); E. Ivlerrick Dodd, J r., For VVhom Are Corporate 
Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REv. 1145 (1932); Adolph Berle, For Whom Corporate 
Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932). 
7. Somewhat similar questions respecting the appropriate constituencies arise in 
the nonprofit context. 
8. The regulatory scheme desc1ibed in this paragraph is not limited to exchanges, 
and currently governs related entities such as the National Association of Securities 
Dealers . The framework is described in more detail in Part IV . To my knowledge, Peter 
Carstensen was the first to suggest the analogy between the NCAA and se<:urities law 
regulation of the exchanges. Thus, my discussion develops his insight, no doubt taking 
it at times in directions he would not have intended. 
r 
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in common with a stock exchange, the analogy proves on inspection to be 
surprisingly close. My analysis suggests that SEC-style regulation would 
give a regulator the flexibility to tak:e advantage of the NCAA's expertise, 
yet also the authority to intervene whe:u appropriate. Securities-style 
regulation is in some respects the most attractive of the corporate law 
accountability mechanisms. It chief limitations are the practical barriers 
to its implementation, and the uncertainty about whether such an extensive 
reform is necessory. 
In the Part that follows, i briefly discuss the significance of the 
NCAA's organizational stmcture. Parts H and HI cons ider the efficacy 
of internal corporate governance mechanisms as a means of enhancing 
NCAA accountability to stude:nt-athJetes, ailct Part IV turns to securities-
style external review. 
L T HE NCAA AS ,1\N UNINCORPOR:H ED .ASSOCIATION 
Perhaps the first surprise about the NCAA from a corporate 
governance perspective is its organizational form. Rather than being 
structured as a nonprofit corporation, as one might expect, the NCAA is 
organized as an unincorporated association located in Kansas. 9 The 
NCAA is at least nominally run by and for its roughly 1000 member 
colleges and universities. Under the NCAA's constitution, each member 
is entitled to vote on the proposed rule changes and additions considered 
at the annual convention, where much of the NCAA's major business is 
conducted. The members elect committees to carry on NCAA business 
between the conventions. 10 
While the NCAA is structured as an unincorporated association, most 
of its members are themselves nonprofit wrporations. Moreover, the 
NCAA has incorporated several aspects of its business. The Association 
has incorporated for-profit corporations both to hold title to the land and 
buildings that it owns and to market the NCAA logo .11 The Association 
9. See, e.g., NCAA v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 1993) (explaining NCAA 
history and organizational form). 
10. See 1994-95 NCAA MANUAL art. 4.1.4 (Council members elected at annual 
convention); id. art. 4.4.4 (Administrative Committee elected at convention); id. art . 4.5.4 
(Presidents Commission elected by chief executive officers of member institutions); id. 
art. 5.1 (regulations governing convention); id. art. 5 .3 (amendments made at convention). 
The Executive Committee is the one central committee whose members are not directly 
elected by the NCAA's membership. The Council rather than the membership as a whole 
chooses the Executive Committee. Id. art. 4.2.4. 
Although I will analogize the NCAA to a corporation, its decisionmaking structure 
resembles a private legislature in many respects, as this discuss ion suggests. 
11. !d. art. 31.9.1 (National Collegiate Realty Corporation); id. art. 31.9.2 
(NCAA Marketing Corporation) . 
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has also structured its charitable foundation as a nonprofit corporation.12 
Thus, the NCAA can be seen as an unincorporated association comprised 
of nonprofit corporation members, and -,vhich has established for-profit 
and nonprofit corporations to carry on various aspects of its business . 
itVhy might the member universities continue to run the NC AA as a11 
unincorporated association rather t1an as a nonprofit or even a for-proflt 
corporation? 13 Entities such as labor uni{:;.ns have traditionally operated 
as incorporated associaiions at least in patt to a'!Oid some of the 
consequences of corporate '"'personhood,, such as ~1e capacity to be sued 
in tl'le corporate name. 14 Many states now auLi)ori.ze suit against 3.1"1 
association, so t..l-Ji s d istinction has lost some of its force. u But similar 
concerns continue to explain rcmch of the attractiveness of unincorpontl_ed 
status. i\n association still cannot sue or be sued (or hold property) in 
association nat-ne unJess state law explicitl ;/ or 1mplicitly authorizes 
suit. 16 The association form may also diminish the likelihood that u1e 
NCAA will qualir; as a state actor, thus helping to insulate its policies 
from certain constitutional challenges . In short, an obvious advantage of 
organizing as an unincorporated association is that it minimizes the 
likelihood of regulatory interference with NCAA policies and actions . 17 
To appreciate the significance of the NCAA 's choice of form from 
a corporate governance perspective, consider first u'le distinctions between 
for-profit and nonprofit corporations. Nonprofits differ from for-profit 
corporations in two ways : state law ordinar ily prohibits a nonpro-fit from 
making dividends or other distributions to its constituents, and nonprofits 
do not have shareholders in the same sense as for-protits. 18 In a pair of 
12. !d. art. 31.9.3 (NCAA Foundation). 
13. lt is pDssible, of course, that the NCA.A's unincorporated status is simply the 
perpetuation of a historical accident. This seems unlikely, hov>'evcr, and the discussion 
that follows suggests several possible motivations for remaining unincorporated. 
14 . See, e.g., HOWARD L. 0LECX, NONPROFHCORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATiONS, 
AND ASSOCIATiONS 102-03 (4th ed . 1980). 
15 . See, e.g., Harry G. Henn & lV! ichael G. Pfeifer, Nonprofit Groups: Factors 
Influencing Choice of Form, 11 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 18 1, 191-92 (1975) . 
16. See, e.g., lVl urray v . Sevier , 156 F .R. D. 235 (D. i{an. 1994); Kansas Private 
Club Ass'n . v. Londerholm, 408 P.2d 891 (Kan. 1965). Associations are subje.ct to suit 
under federal law, however. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b) prov ides that 
regardless of its status under state law, any association may sue or be sued !n its common 
name for the purpose of enforcing a substantive right existing under the Constitution or 
laws of the United States. 
17. Prior to the reforms set in motion by the .Securities EJ<change Act of 193 r-~, 
the New York Stock E;{change had long eschewed i11corporaticn for pr·x isely the same 
re<~sons . See Richard W . .lennings , Self Regulmion in the Securiti,;s Industry : Th e Role 
of the SEC, 29 LAW & COl'>l!E.MP. PRO:t'>S . &63, 667-68 (1964). 
18. Se,?, e.g., Deveiopments in the L.aw: Nonprofit Corporatior.s, 105 HARV. L. 
REv. 1580, 1582 (1992) [hereinafter Developments]. 
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classic articles on flonprofits, Henry Hansman.I1 contende.::! that the 
relationship between these attributes is not accid~ntal. D He argued that 
1-]...,a. nonpro~rll" fr)··· ··· \ ~· r·i(~f'"''" "' " a cor·-l•ractual b'~" ·"'"'1-1ju~rvn '""'"'olem Th· 0 U !l. ........ -·l "' -- ~--.1 1.1: ... ·~··..! .... \ ""''0"-'~ \.. _ (. .l.·-~· '7'\ . .:1.;.. i--' .!V • .l .. v 
nondistd bution rule compensates for t11e fact that a nonprotit' s 
constituents are oft:::m poorlv situated to monitor r:nana~ement by strictly 
" - ~ . . . . , ' "1' d" -·~ l 21) 11 . J;m:tmg managers am 1ty to 1vert assets to tEemse.ves . 11s 
protection corm:.s at a orice, however. Because tb t;y c:;umot seE stock and 
- " . 
do not have stockho lders to encourage ma.11agers to emph i!si:ze fina11c ial 
retl.Jm, nonprofits oh:e:n have difficulty obtaining fin ancing from lenders 
and similar sour\;.% .2 t 
lt is immediate~ ; apJ.Y:trent Lt:!at the NCAA is simil2.r \\1 some respects, 
but not in udwrs, r.o this generalized account of nonprofi·~ corporations . 
Uk~ a nonprof}\ co:cporation, the NCAA's o.ssociation form. m<1y affect its 
abi lity to obtain fln.::mcing . This, together '.Vith tax ~.::oncerns and lingering 
• • ' • • , • , 1 l . 
1.mcertamtr~s ~'lOOlJt an assocJatiOn s capac1ty to i'lOJC. property m 
association no:\rt\:; , tnay explain the NCAA's decision to set up for-profit 
corporations for its marketi:ng efforts and to hoid its property .12 
Although the l\lCAA lacks a shareholder constituency as a result of its 
association form, its members are actively involved in 'CAA governance 
and well-positioned to monitor its management. 23 From this perspective, 
the NCAA res..;mbles mutual nonprofits, which are run by and for their 
membersl-1 to a much greater extent than donor nonprofits such as 
charities. 
By eschewing the for-profit form, despite Lhe obvious profit motives 
that enter into many of the NCAA 's activities, member institutions assure 
themselves complete control o ver NCAA operations. To the extent that 
members' interests do not confl ict with those of student-athletes, the 
association fo rm se:rves both quite effectively . This may not always be 
the case, however , especially given the obstacles to accountabi lity an 
association poses. TI-1e followi ng Parts explore v.;hether corporate 
19. Henry B . Hansmann, Reforming Nonpr~jit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. 
REV. 497 (1 981) [hereinafter Refimning Nonprofit]; Henry B . Ha.nsmann, The Role of 
Nonprofit EnterprLre, 39 YALE LJ . 835 (1980) [hereinafter The Ro!e of Nonprofit ]. 
20 . Set', e.g., Hansmann, The Role ofNonproji.t, supra note 19, at 343-45 . 
21. id. ~lt 877 . 
22 . The most obvious ta.x concem is that the for-profit activ ities wou ld jeopardize 
the NCAA' s nonpmfiL status . 
23 . The nondistribution constraint (which does not by its terms apply to an 
unincorp-oratr_.d 2.ssociation) is thus les s impo rtant for the N CA./;. than fo r charitable 
non profits. ·Moreover, the NCAA's ability to make distribut:ons is limited by lntemal 
Rev~nue Code rcst1~ctions O!l nonprofit organizations . 
24. See, e.g. , ;-t.n~smar:n , The F.c•le of Nonprofit, siJ.pm note 19, at 892-94 
(describ ing certain mutud nonprotits, such as social clubs , as an except ion to the co ntract 
failure expJan;:ltion for t.he nonpro tit form). 
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governance devices might offer more input and/or protections to student-
athletes , and what adjustments may be requ ired in order to tailor these 
devices to the NCAA ' s association fo:rm .25 
H. INTERNAL CORPO~<\TE GOVERNANCE: PUTIING STUDENT-ATHLETE 
REPRESENTATIVES ON NCAA ('\!"''D MEMBER INSTITUTION) 
C oMMITTEEs 
The interests of shareholders are represented in two general ways in 
the for-profit corporation context. First, shareholders are represented 
directly , in that they are entitled to choose d ir0etors who will pursue their 
interests .26 Corporate law fiduciary duty standards reinforce d irectors ' 
obligations to shueholders, Xn addition to selecting directors , 
shareholders may sue d irectors who h3Pre violated any of their fiduciary 
duties. 
The next two Parts exain ine these protections' effectiveness for 
student-athletes. This Pa..rt cons iders the efficacy of direct student-athlete 
representation; Part HI turns to fiducioxy duty. 
As noted above, the NCAA conducts much of its business at its 
annual convention, where member institutions vote on proposed legislative 
action. The fo rty-four member Council, together with the Presidents 
Commission, wields much of the NCAA's . decisionmaking authority 
between conventions .27 While member institutions correspond roughly 
to shareholders, and the governing councils to the board of a for-profit 
corporation, members play a much more active (and managerial) role in 
NCAA decisionmaking, since they vote directly on much of the NCAA's 
business at the annual convention.2g 
25. As noted at the outset, '..Vhile my initial focus is on NCAA-level 
decisionmaking, I also consider the applicability of several of these protections at the 
member institution level. 
26. See, e.g. , DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (1994) (shareholder voting on 
directors). Shareholders also vote directly on extraordinary matters. See, e.g., DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1994) (mergers) . 
27. See, e.g., 1994-95 NCAA M ANUAL art. 4.1.3 (Council's powers between 
conventions); id. art. 4. 5 .3 (powers of Presidents Commission). Since its establishment 
in 1984, and contrary to early suspicion that it would play only a superficial role, the 
Presidents Commission has become increzsingly powerful in NCAA affairs. The 
Presidents Commission currently has substantial control over the convention agenda, for 
instance, and has veto pDWer over the selection of the NCAA Executive Director. ld. art. 
4 .5.3(b) (respDnsibility for uplac[ing] any matter of concern on the agenda"); id. art . 
4.5 .3(h) (power to uapprove the appointment of an <:xecutive director of the Association"). 
For a description of the origins and rise of the Presidents Commission, see Smith, supra 
note 1, at 998-1005. 
28. The NCA/\ thus functions somewhat like a hybrid between a publicly held 
corporation, whose shareholders play only a minimal role , and a closely held corporation, 
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One ·way to emiance student-athletes' voice would be to give them 
representation eit1er at the anrmal convention or on the principal ·NCAA 
committees, or both. 29 For followers of for-profit corporation law, this 
suggestion wHl have a strikingly famil iar ring . A cal l to add an addition <:~J 
constituency-here, student-athletes- to the NCAA's decisionmak:ing 
process paral lels in many ways the periodic movements to place employee 
representatives on the boards of fo r-profit coq.~orations30 or to implement 
cumulativ-e voting to maximize the likelihood that minority interests wiH 
elect at least one director. 31 Kn both contexts, inclusion is j ustified as 2 
means of ensuring that deci.sionm~cers will pay closer attention to the 
constituency in question . 
Interestingly, while a caB for sruclem--at.l-:ilcte representation mirrors 
efforts to implement employee co-representation in mai1Y respects, th;;: 
case fo r student-athlete representation may actually be appreciably 
stronger. Because the traditional view of corporate law holds that 
directors' prin1ary respons ibility is to maxirnize profits for shareholders , 
observers have long criticized direct employee representation as 
undermining directors' focus on shareholder interests. 32 Moreover, 
employees arguably do not need a governance mechanism like voting, 
since in theory t.t1ey can use contractual arrangements to protect 
themselves against exploitation far more effectively than shareholders. 33 
whose shareholders serve both as shareholders and as managers of the finn . See also 
supra note 10 (NCAA in some r-espects more like a private legislature than a corporation). 
29. Giving student-athletes direct representation at the university level would offer 
similar benefits, and suffer from similar limitations, as I discuss in somewhat more detail 
below. 
30. The movement to place representatives on corporate boards, often described 
as "co-representation," was particularly prominent in the 1960s and 1970s, and was 
inspired by the use of co-representation in Germany and other European countries. See, 
e.g., Clyde W . Summers, Worker Participation in the U.S. and West Gennany: A 
Comparative Study from a US. Perspective, 28 A.ill!. J . COMP. L. 367 (1980). 
31. For a recent discuss ion of cumulative voting, and an argument that 
institutional shareholders should look to it as a means of enhancing their ability to monitor 
for-profit boards, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look 
at Cumulative Voting, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 124 (1994). 
32. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 
J .L. & EcoN. 395, 405 (1 983) (describing the agency costs of multi-constituency 
representation). 
33. Oliver Williamson , Corporate Governance, 93 YALE LJ. 1197 (1984). 
Williamson argues that contractual safeguards are a means of curbing opportunism that 
might otherwise occur in contexts where the parties have invested in transaction-specific 
assets; that is, where the parties have committed resources to a contract that could not b,e 
fu lly recouped elsewhere if the contract were to fall through . .AJthough employees malce 
such an investment ·when they acquire fl1'111-sp-ecific skills , \Villiamson argues that 
employees can bargain fot termination fees and other devices in order to protect 
themselves. !d. at 1207-09 . For an argument that employees may nevertheless benefit 
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Both arguments lose much of their force in the NCAA context. 
However commercial the NCAA may be, maximizing profits for its 
members is not, or at least should not be, the NCAA's sole goal. The 
NCAA ' s constitution, for instance, defines the '" physical and educational 
wel fare of student-athletes" as a fundamental principle of intercollegiate 
athletics. 34 At tile least, student-athletes should be seen as third party 
beneficiaries of the agreements entered into by member institutim1.s and 
the NCAA. Unlike employee representation on a for-profit board, t.'l)en, 
student-athl ete representation would reinforce rather tt1an distract the 
NCAA from its primary objectives . 
Student-athletes are also less able to secure contractual safeguards 
tha..'1 employees. As noted above, employees theoretically can protect 
their interests in their existing jobs by negotiating for contractual 
safeguards such as the right to a term.inatiol:1 fee if fired. Consequently, 
they may not need or benefit from the add itional protect ion of 
representation on the employer's board of directors. 35 Student-athletes 
are particularly vulnerable, since their eligibility is limited to a brief 
period of a few years; yet they have almost no means of protecting their 
interests by contract. 36 This is especially true of those athletes who hope 
to move on to a professional career, since college athletics is the most 
important (and for many, the only) opportunity they have to develop and 
demonstrate their talents. 37 Given the absence of other protections, one 
from board representation because of long-term commitments to their existing jobs, see 
John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance as a Multi-Player Game, 
78 GEO. L.J. 1495 (1990). 
34. 1994-95 NCAA MANUAL a1t. 2.2. 
35. Vv'hether employees do in fact have access to adequate contractual protections 
is, of course, debatable, even if one considers not only explicit contractual provisions but 
also the effect that external market pressures have on wages and working conditions. For 
present purposes, my ptincipal point is that whatever one's view of employees' need for 
representation, student-athletes seem to have a significantly greater claim. 
36. Professor Remington makes an interesting argument that student-athletes 
should in fact seek, and NCAA member institutions should give, explicit contractual 
protections such as a commitment to continue the student's scholarship after her eligibility 
expires. Frank J. Remington, Universities and Student-Athletes: Keeping Promises and 
Fulfilling a Mission, 1995 Wrs. L. REv. 765. \\'hile these kinds of provisions would 
provide many student-athletes with iiubstantially more protection than voting rights, the 
parties' current failure to agree to such provisions underscores the need for other sources 
of protection, such as voting rights. The bargaining asymmetry between the parties and 
the difficulty of spelling out the university's responsibilities in complete detail may also 
reinforce the possible value of a fiduciary duty approach in the absence of, or in addition 
to, explicit contract terms, as I discuss in Part HI. 
37. The brevity of a college athlete's ca reer makes unionizing less likely in the 
NCAA than in the professional sports context. The strict limitations on compensation and 
transfer reinforce student-athletes' vuL11erability . See 1994-95 NCAA. MANUAL art. 15 .1 
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can make a st:wng argument that student-athletes an:: precisely the kind of 
constituency tor whom direct representation makes sense.35 
A comparison to the nonprof1t sector reinforce,;; the case for student-
athlete representation . Unlike for-protlts, which generaliy do not provide 
for multiple constituency representation, rnany nonprofits include 
representatives of specific interests on their boards. T.his is por ticuarly 
true of charitable nonprofits such as tmiversrtles, hospital s and 
organizatiom such as t.he Y.tviCA that do not h<rve a sitlgle, v;eH-defined 
constituency. 
The NCAA has in fact begun to increase stud~nt·at.hietes' inf!u.e:nee 
i:n I"-JCAA dedsiomnaking. In addition to requiriri;g ;;:ach member 
institution to establish a student-athlete advisory com.mhtee, the 
membership voted at the most recent convention to add student-.athlete 
advisors to five NCAA comm.ittf'.-es. 39 The obvim1s limitarion of these 
reforms is that each restricts student-athletes to an informal role, rather 
than giving them direct decisionmaking authority. <o The question, then, 
is whether student-athletes deserve actual voting pmver at the I'>JCAA or 
member institution level. 
One possible concern with direct representation involves another 
objection frequently directed at co-representation proposals in the for-
profit context: that adding student representatives would create a problem 
economists describe as "cycling. "41 The concern is that, however 
laudable the objectives may be, ensuring representation on the Council or 
(student-athlete ineligible if receives more than a full grant-in-aid); id. art. 14.5 .1 
(student-athlete must sit out one year after transfer) . Notice that the transfer rule, while 
undermining a student-athlete's position, acts as a safeguard for the athlete's university, 
since it reduces the risk that a student-athlete will defect to anothe r school. 
38. An alternative approach might be to relax the restrictions on student-athletes' 
ability to contract. Commentators and at least one activist hav;~ long advocated this step, 
arguing in particular that college athletes should be paid . See , e.g . , Lee Goldman, Sports 
and Antitrust: Should College Students Be Paid to Play? , 65 N o TRE DAl\iE L. REV. 206 
(1990); ML.~eJensen, Play-for-Pay Advocate Goes 1-on-J with !VCAA, PHILA. INQUIRER., 
Nov. 18, 1994, at Al (describing Dick DeVenzio's 12-year campaign to alter NCAA 
compensation restrictions). 
39. See Jack L. Copeland, Student-Athlete We lfare Principles Overwhelmingly 
Adopted, NCAA NEWS, Jan. 11, 1995, at 7. Student-athletes are also members of some 
universities ' delegations to the Convention. See Allison, supra note 3 (questioning 
efficacy of student-athletes' input in a delegation or on the Adviso ry Committee) . 
40. The NC.V, does give (limite-d) direct representation to wom.:on and, to a lesser 
extent, minorities. Se,;; 1994-95 NCAA fv!A'\,fUAL art. 4 .1.1 (tequiring at least 12 women 
on the 44-member Council); id. art. 4.2.1 (at least th ree women on 1 4-membe:~ Executive 
Committee); id. art. 4.5.1 (at least three \Nomen on 4-4-member Executive Committee) . 
Some conferences give student-athletes a direct roie in conference decisionn1aking . 
41. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 32 , a t t~05; W illiam J . Carney , Does 
Defining Constituencies Matter?, 59 CI!'IN. L. :REV. 3g5 , 420-22 (1 990) . 
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other con1Jxdtiees to groups with particular perspectives (such as at.l-J. letes', 
women's, or minorities ' interests) could seriously undermine these bodies' 
ability to spea.~ with a coherent, unifl ed voice. As a result, the committee 
(or t.1e membership as a whole, in the context of the annual convention) 
might enact a series of inconsistent ru1es 2L5 various coalitions formed and 
then shifted, or it might hw e difficul~y enacting anything in t.t'1e r1rst 
instai1ce. 42 
The NCAi-\ do:es differ ifro:m a for -profit corporation in at least ODe 
'+h> . . l" ' F' c· ~·. d' , , I " way Wlu resp·x:r 1:0 eye" mg. 'l t nerea.s toor-pro:!n 1recwrs arguan.y :mcus 
on the single, weB-defined goal of ens1Jrlng a profit for shareholders h; 
the absence of :rnuJdple con..s titu0ncy representation, NCAA 
decisionma.'l(:ing already induch:,'; a variety of perspectives and goals, both 
within its membership and a,_mo:ng its various constituencies . As a result, 
NCAA decisiorunaldng i:n some inst;:u.\C$0 :resembles a legisl ature rnore 
than. a corporation.'B Stated d ifferently, tbe potential for cycl ing al ready 
·----·- ---·----~·-·-------
42. Carney, supra note 41, at 420-22 . To appreciate how cycling can develop , 
consider a simplified group of decisionmake•·s that includes one individual representing 
a member university, one representing women, and one representing student-athletes. 
Their preferences v;~ith respect to three possible resolutions of a particular issue are as 
follows: 
Member University: A, B, C 
Women: B, C, A 
Student-Athlete: C, A, B 
Given these preferences, if the representatives vote in accordance with their preferences, 
none of the three outcomes can consistently defeat the other two in pairwise voting. Thus, 
Member Uni•1ersity's flrst choice of A would defeat B (since Member University and 
Student-Athlete both prefer A over B), but both Women and Student-Athlete prefer C to 
A; yet B defeats C, and so on. One way to ensure a winning choice even where, as her.;;, 
the parties' preferences are multi-peaked, is to adopt a procedural rule that prohibits the 
decisiomnakers from reconsidering an alternati'Je thty have previously rejected. Thus, 
if A is matched first against B, then against C, C will emerge as the winning choice. Yet 
the outcome is arbitra:r;, since both :Member University and ·women prefer B to C, and 
the decisionmakers might easily reverse this choice at their next meeting. The choice also 
is subject to manipulation if one of the parties has agenda contro l. For an extensive 
discussion of these issues, see i'viaxwdl L. Stearns, The iViisguided Renaissance of Social 
Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219 (1994); Saul Levmore , Parliamentary Law, Majority 
.Decisionmaking, and the Voting Paradox, 75 VA. L. REV. 971 (1989). 
43. This is particularly true given that the NCAA's member institutions vote on 
much of its busi;1ess at the annual convention. On the other hand, the Presidents 
Commission and the Council act somewhat like a board of directors, since the Presidents 
Commission det.';nnine:s the order ir. which pmposals are voted on, see 1994-95 NCAA 
Mr\NUAL art. 4 .5.3(e), the Council appoints many of the association's operating 
committees , id. art. 4 .1.3(b), and both are within the limited group of decisionmakers 
who have authority to initiate legislation. See, e.g., id. art. 5.3 .2.1 (only Presidents 
Commission, Council, Division Steering Committee, group of eight or more members, 
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exists, and it is not clear how much s!:udent-athle·te representation would 
exacerbate the problem.4<1 
Cycling is not t:1e only concern, however. NCAA decisionmakers 
might also agree to student-athlete representation but then effectively 
marginalize the role of the representatives. 45 If the NCAA gave student-
athletes a prescribed number of votes at lhe convention, for instance, 
these votes would lose value if the association shifted much of its 
decisionmaking authority to the comr1 itte-~ that conduct NCAA business 
between conventions . 46 
To the extent direct representation remains attractive despite these 
concerns, add ition.81 questions rernain as to who student-athletes ' 
representatives might be a.n.d how u1ey should be seiected. Tne NCAA's 
current approach to women's reoresentation is simnlv to set aside a . . ., 
specified minin::um number of slots for representatives who are women, 
without otherwise al tering the seiection process. This strategy would not 
work for student-athletes, given that student-athletes do not hold the kinds 
44. In the legislative context, the risk of cycling often is conteracted by vote 
trading, or "logrolling. " That is, constituencies agree to vote for a measure they may not 
support in return for votes in favor of a subsequent measure about which they feel 
strongly. Thus, to return to the example in note 42, Student-Athlete might agree to 
support B in return for Women's promise to back a proposal of particular interest to 
Student-Athlete. See, e.g., Steams, supra note 42, at 1278-79 nn.223-25 (discussing 
logrolling). The large amount of discussion among members prior to and in connection 
with the annual convention strongly suggests that NCAA members engage in logrolling. 
Whether logrolling is desirable is debatable, of course, but it does reduce cycling. 
Cycling also is less likely if some member institutions have disproportionate influence. 
Members of high revenue conferences such as the Big Ten and Pacific Ten are widely 
viewed as having particular influence due to the fear that they will simply secede from the 
NCAA if they conclude that its regulations are excessive. 
45. This appears to have occurred during the attempts to reform the New York 
Stock Exchange during the New Deal era. During William Douglas' term as chairman 
of the SEC, the SEC pressured the New York Stock Exchange to alter its governing 
structure in order to reduce the traditional dominance of floor traders. Although the 
exchange agreed to include a substantial minority of non-floor trader members and non-
members on the governing board, r1oor traders subsequently reasserted control by 
arranging the delegation of important decisions to committees they controlled . See JoEL 
SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 166, 178, 324 (1982). Notice that 
behavior of this sort can be seen as a particularly malignar:t exercise of agenda control. 
46. The poss ibility of a shift in auth01;ty in the NCiu-\ is not at all hypothetical. 
As noted earlier, the Presidents Commission did not even exist until the 1980s and was 
initially seen as largely powerless . It has subsequently b;;.come a major force in NCAA 
decisionmaking. See supra note 27. If student-athletes were represented on other 
committees, but not on the Presidents Commission , they eould e,9.s ily lose much of their 
leverage. Even if committees that lacked student-athlete participation did not arrogat:: 
additional authority , student-athletes ' inability to i..r1itiate legislation would significantly 
limit their influence. 
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of positions from which NCAA representatives currently are chosen. 47 
Should the NCAA decide to give student-at.t1letes representation, it thus 
would face the difficult issue of deciding who should be el igible to vote: 
al l students; all student-athletes; athletes at particular universities; student 
body presidents; or some other defined group. 
As noted earlier, some conferences al ready provide for student input 
in conference decisionmaking. Big Ten universities generally select their 
representatives through a campus-wide vote. This approach illustrates 
some of the difficulties in assuring that student-athletes have meaningful 
input. If the student chosen to represent t.~e university is not herself a 
student- at.~lete, for instance, there is some question as to how effectively 
she can speak for student-athletes; and, as discussed earlier, even student-
athletes have very different perspectives. The brevity of student-athletes' 
presence further undermines the continuity of tl-}eir input. 48 
Nevertheless, there is something to be said for giving students the 
opportunity to speak for themselves about what they see as student-
athletes' "interests." Simply having student-athletes present, as recent 
reforms allow, may increase member institutions' incentive to focus on 
student-athletes, but it significantly dilutes any benefits actual voting 
authority might offer. 
III. INTERNAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: STUDENT-ATHLETES AND 
FIDUCIARY DUTY LITIGATION 
The approach discussed above, direct representation, can be seen as 
an ex ante, or before-the-fact, strategy since it would assure student-
athletes a say in the development and application of NCAA rules. This 
Part considers whether the traditional ex post corporate law remedy, suing 
the managers of an entity after t'1ey fail to live up to their fiduciary 
duties, might be a means of enhancing student-athletes' influence in 
NCAA decisionmaking. 
The fiduciary duty approach can only come into play if NCAA and 
university decisionmakers do in fact owe a fiduciary duty to student-
47. For instance, the NCAA Manual defines "faculty athletics representative" as 
"a member of an institution's faculty or administrative staff who is designated by the 
institution's chief executive officer .. . to represent the institution." 1994-95 NCAA 
M ANUAL art. 4.02.1 Student-athletes ordinarily do not meet this definition. 
48. An obvious alternative would be to use ex-athletes or professional 
representatives. For a somewhat analogous proposal in the corporate literature, see 
Ronald J . Gilson & Reinier Kraakman , Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for 
institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV . 863 (1991) . The chief limitations of this 
approach would be the cost of engaging professionals and the possibility that outside 
representatives of this sort would only imperfectly share student-athletes' perspectives. 
. ] 
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athletes. I therefore begin this Part by discussing th -~ appropriate scope 
of managers' fiduciary duties in the NCAA context . I then ask whether 
student-athletes would have standing to enforce these duties; discuss the 
procedural hurdles such a suit might face a.i1d ·whether the litigation would 
prove effective; compare the fiduciary duty approach with a somewhat 
analogous contract-based argument that a univers ity owes its student-
athletes an implied duty of good fai t.."tt ; and, finally, address u1e practical 
obstacles to th is approach . 
A. Fiduciary Duty Standards in NCAA and University Decisionmaking 
The initial issue considered in much of the literature on fiduciary 
duties to nonprofits is how closely nonprofit duties should mirror for-
profit standards. Because of the traditional perception of nonprofits as 
noncommercicJ and even charitable in nature, states at times have applied 
di fferent fidu ciary standards to nonprofits. Nonprofit directors may be 
held to a more ienient standard of care as a result!'9 On the other hand, 
states have sometimes construed the duty of loyalty very strictly, 
prohibiting any transaction between a director and the nonprofit on the 
basis that it is particularly important to remove any hint of impropriety 
in the nonprofit context. As several commentators have recently noted, 
each of these deviations poses problems. Relaxing th.e duty of care 
diminishes directorial accountability, and the heightened duty of loyalty 
may chill even desirable transactions between a director and the nonprofit. 
A better approach, and one that the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation 
Act has largely adopted, is to apply similar standards to for-profit and 
nonprofit directors. 50 
Although the NCAA is an unincorporated nonprofit, similar 
reasoning suggests, at least as a normative matter , that NCAA 
decisionrnakers should also be held to for-profit standards in conducting 
49. See, e.g. , Henry Hansmann, The Evoiving Law of Nonprofit Organizations: 
Do Current Trends i>'lake Good Policy?, 39 CASE W. L. REV. 807 (1989). Some courts 
and commentators have argued for a stricter duty of care, due to the absence of market 
constraints on directorial decisionmaking in the nonprofit context. See Developments, 
supra note 18, at 1602 (describing and rejecting this view). 
50. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § g .30 ( 1981); Developments, supra 
note 18, at 1601-04. While the general for-profit fiduciarj duty standards are also 
appropriate for nonprofits, for-profit standards arguably should not be imported wholesale 
in all circumstances. See, e.g. , Deborah A. Del'vlott, Self-Dealing Transactior..s in 
Nonprofit Corporations, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 131 (1 993) (arguing that proponents of a 
self-dealing transaction i..·wolving charitable nonpro fits should be required to prove 
afflnnatively the transaction's fairness). 
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business for or with the NCAA . 51 This conclus ion speaks only to ilie 
relative stringency of courts' scrutiny, however, and leaves several crucial 
issues unresolved . First, what would be the nature of NCAA 
decisionmakers ' duty? The NCAA's articulated mission is to preserve 
and promote amateur athletics, <IS well as education. NCAA 
decisionmakers' duty :must therefore include :an obligation to pursue lhese 
objectives in a reasonably prudent manner.s2 
A second, and, fro m a student-athiete's perspective, particularly 
important question, is whether NCAA decisionmakers owe a duty directly 
to student-athletes, rather than solely to the member institutions thai: 
comprise the I'lCAA's primary constituency. Like the analogy between 
co-representation <Lid student-athlete representation, the argument that 
NCAA decision;·na..tcers owe a duty directly to student-athletes c!osely 
parallels the arguments in the for-profh context for "other constitu-ency" 
prov1s1ons, which requir~ directors to cons ide~: the interests of 
nonshareholder constituencies .53 Just as '"other constih!ency" statutes 
require (or invite) directors to deviate from their trad itional charge to 
focus exclusively on shareholders, holding NCAA decisionmakers 
accountable not just to their members but also to student-athletes could be 
seen as an expansion of their existing duties . 
51. Giveo that many universities are nonprofit corporations, the nonprofit analysis 
in the preceding text applies directly to university decisionmalcers . While my initial focus 
is on a duty owed by NCAA decisionmakers to student-athletes, I argue below that a 
member university should also have a duty to its student-athletes . 
52. Which NCAA dec isionmaking bodies should be subject to the duty, and 
whether the duty should vary among decisionmaking bodies, are add itional issues to 
consider. For instance, it seems clear that members of the Presidents Council should be 
subject to a duty, but attributing a duty to each member represented at the annual 
convention is more problematic as a conceptual matter. 
An additional question is whether NCAA decisionmakers ' fiduciary duties also 
should apply to operating level actions such as a decis ioo by the In fractions Committee 
to impose sanctions on a member institution or its athletes . For the duty to be fully 
e ffective, it would need to apply to individual infractions deci:.ions as well as to the 
decision whether to implement a particular rule. 
53. The call for holding directors respons ible to a broad array of constituencies, 
rather than so lely to shareholders, dates back at !east to Dodd's debate with Berle. See 
supra note 6. The argument has gained particular force in recent years in the wal\:e of the 
takeover wave of the 1980s, as a response to the damaging effect takeovers are thought 
to have on nonshareholder constituencies. Twenty-eight states have now adopted statutes 
that either pennit or require for-p rofit directors to take sta.l<eholders' (that is, 
constituencies other than shareholders) interests into account. Lawrence E. M itche ll , A 
Theoretical and Practical Frameworkfor Enforcing Cmporate Constituency Statutzs , 70 
TEX. L. REV. 579 (1992) (defending the statutes). For a criticism of these statutes, see 
Carney, supra note 41. 
. ] 
1995:669 ,Perspectives em Studen.t-Athletes 685 
Despite the fac t that studem-at.h!ett'-S do not on initial inspection 
appear to be 1}ne r-JCAA's principal constituency, tbe case for a duty to 
student-athlet~'l ls particularly attractive. Whereas for-profit corporations 
have traditiotlBJ ly owed feaJty , at least in theDry, solely to their 
shareholders , tb,: r"TCAA 's mission as protector oi arnateur athletics 
already extends b~yond its members' pc:xochial concerns to encompass the 
. ~ ' - 1 1 > • 1' '4 mterests or si:I.K!c::r:rH-.t)'1.ete.s, as mseusseo ear wr.-
As \vith the duty of care !:n the for-profit context, ·t_,'-}~~ most ifltractable 
limitation Oil loo~z1ng (J 'NC.AA d-edsio:r.mal:cers' f1ch1d 2.ry dutie~ as a 
' ' •' rl ' l • th 1 . .J source ot pmt~:-e:uoo. ·ror snk.ent-aJ.n;etes 1s at courts are poor.y S!tuateu 
to second-guess NCAA d~cisionmaki:ng . Courts c:rre :not any more expert 
in evaluating ~_l~t ~ effec1.s of a ~given ~iC ,~i\ rule on studenc-athleres and 
amateur ar..hl stks than they are 'Hith respect to mor.~; tradit ional business 
deciSiODS. 55 lrt r;on.sequence, the broad deference extended tO directors' 
decisiomnakillg purs<.E;,nt to the business judgment :ru J ,~ in L~e for-profit 
context secrns 1 at l~.ast 2t i1rst glance., to be sirxlil ~3J'l y appropriate for 
NCAA decislonmaking. 56 
Given the need to defer to NCAA expertise, and the uncertainty as 
to what student-athletes' interests are, the fiduciary duty approach is 
subject to appreciable limitations. But a strong case can be made that 
NCAA decisionmakers should and do in fact owe such a duty to their 
student-athletes . I will return to uie question whether fiduciary duty is 
likely to be an effective protection for student-athletes below, but first I 
consider sever.oJ procedural issues . 
B. Would Stwlen.t-Athletes Have Standing to Sue? 
Just as import&llt as w.~e issue of what an NCAA or member 
institution decisionrnaker's fiduciary duty would entail is the related 
question whether student-athletes would have standing to enforce the duty. 
In addressing this issue, it is useful to begin by focusing on fiduciary duty 
claims student-athietes might make against NCAA decisionmakers, and 
54. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. Student-athletes' relative inability 
to protect themselves by contract further reinforces the case for fiduciary duty protection . 
The argument that university decisionmakers owe their student-athletes a fiduciary duty 
is potentially everr stronger, since students are a principal constituency of Lheir 
universities. Sez iPfw. part IH.B. 
55. in a r;~_se ll'!olving the closely related issue of r~uirements for participating 
in the Olympics , Judge Posner wrote a separate concurrence solely to underscore courts' 
laclc of expertis-e i11 millci•1g decisions about amateur athletics. Michels v. United States 
Olympic Comm. , 741 f' .2d 155, 158 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner , J. , concurring). 
56. For a classic example of courts' deference under the business judgment rule, 
see Shlensky v. 'Wrigley, 237 N .E.2d 776 (1U. 1968) (rejecting challenge to directors' 
decision not to hold night games at vVrigley Field baseball park). 
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then to turn to the suits a student-athlete might bring against her own 
university . 
For many nonprofit corporations, th;;; issue of standing has proven 
particularly troublesome due to L*1e abs.rmce of shareholders or an 
analogous constituency mat is di:rectiy harmed by directorial breach. The 
states' usual response has be.:;D. to ves~: stmding in the state attorney 
general, but Lj..lis is at most a second-best solution due to resource 
constraints and other limitations on attomey ge11erals' effectiveness. 57 
The stzmding issue is less problernatic as a conceptual Inatter for a 
member-run organization like L~e NCAA. 1Viuch like tlle shareholders of 
a for-profit corporation, 1::.~e members of th:::; 1\ IClhA benefit or suffer most 
directly fwm NCAA decisions; as a. re.:sult, t1i•;;;y are the obvious choice 
to bring suit in the event of a breach >'8 T hus, as a general matter, it 
appears that t.l-:le NCAA's members rather than anyone else should have 
standing to enforce any breach of NCAA decisionmllicers' duties of care 
and loyaJty. 59 
Whether vesting standing in. the member institutions also makes sense 
when the alleged breach relates to student-athletes is a more difficult 
question, however. Members often have very different incentives from 
a student-athlete. If a student-athlete wished to challenge the NCAA's 
limits on compensation, for instance, her university would have little 
incentive to defend her cause, because an increase in compensation would 
mean higher costs for the university. Moreover, even if the university 
were sympathetic to an athlete's grievance, it might refuse to pursue the 
57. See, e.g., DeMott, supra note 50, at 145; Developments, supra note 18, at 
1605-06. 
58. Consistent with this notion, some states give members of a nonprofit 
corporation derivative standing either by statute or by common law. N.Y. NoT-FOR-
PROFIT CORP. LAW§ 623 (Consol. 1990 & Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-56-401 
(1994); Developments, supra note 18, at 1605. 
59. The derivative provision in the NCAA's home state of Kansas explicitly 
contemplates the possibility of suit by the members of an unincorporated association, see 
KAN. STAT. ;.\NN. § 60-223a (1994), suggesting that the NCAA's members do in fact 
have standing to sue. The issue of standing becomes somewhat less clear on inspection, 
however, at least for suits that are derivative rather than direct, as discussed in more 
detail below. See ir:fra note 83 and accompanying text. 
In addition to its explicit inclusion of members of an unirJCorporated association, the 
Kansas provision also is significant in that, unlike many provis ions applicable to nonprofit 
corporations, it does not impose the additional prerequisite that a minimum percentage of 
members join any derivative suit. See, e.g., N .Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 623 
(Consoi. 1990 & Supp. 1995) (minimum of five percent of members). Because each 
member instiiution has a significant stake in the NC~\A's actions, despite compruing 
much less than one percent of NCAA membership, and given the reluctance many 
institutions will have to join a challenge to NCAi'>. decisionmaking, members should be 
entitled to initiate fiduciary duty litigation individually. 
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claim for fear that chall:;mging NCAA aull1ority would invite 
retaliation. 60 
An obvious alternative to member-initiated litigation is allowing 
student-athletes to file suit if NCAA decisiorunakers appear to have 
neglected their interests . \Vhet..1er courts would in fact recognize student-
athlete standing is unclear, however. Courts have often been 
extraordinarily reluctant to permit additional constituencies to enforce 
directorial duties on behalf of both for--profit and nonprofit 
corporations. 61 Yet the arguments for student-athlete sta.t1d ing are quite 
powerful. 62 l'vioreover, if the student-athlete's claim is against her 
60. The NCAA has in fact shown a willingness to retaliate. When a group of 
prominent schools challenged the NCAA hegemony over co liege footbaLl television rights, 
the l'·l CA.D,. made clear that it would discipline any member S·chool that recognized their 
television contract. The rebelling schools proved successful only when the Supreme Court 
held that the NCAA's actions vioiated the antit rust laws. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 
468 U .S. 85, 95, 120 (1984). 
The confEcts of interest between a student-athlete and her university are analogous 
in interesting respects to those arising in connection with for-profit directors' general duty 
to act lawfully. Although for-profit directors are subject to a fiduciary duty suit if they 
cause the corporation to break a law, shareholders may be better off looking the other 
way, since the improper behavior may actually benefit the corporation fmancially and, 
even if it does not, calling attention to the problem could prove costly for the finn. See, 
e.g., Patrick J. Ryan, Strange Bedfellows: Corporate Fiduciaries and the General Law 
Compliance Obligation in Section 2. OJ (a) of the American Law Institute's Principles of 
Corporate Governance, 66 WASH. L. REV. 413 (1991). 
61. See, e. g. , O'Donnell v. Sardegna, 646 A.2d 398 (Md. 1994) (subscribers to 
health services insurance plans denied standing to sue former officers and directors); 
DeMott, supra note 50, at 145 (noting that standing 'Nith respect to charitable nonprofits 
often is limited to state attorneys general and the co rporation). In the for-profit context, 
courts' general unwillingness to expand standing is re flected by their hostility towards 
bondholders' efforts to sue on fiduciary duty grounds. See, e.g., Simons v. Cogan, 549 
A.2d 300 (Del. 1988) (no fiduciary duty owed to ho lders of convertible debentures); see 
also Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty upon Corporate insolvency: Proper Scope of 
Directors' Duty to Creditors, 46 VAJ'iD. L. REv. 1485 (1993) (arguing that, while 
directors are said to owe a fiduciary duty to creditors when a corporation becomes 
insolvent, most of the cases involve fraudulent conveyances or preferences rather than true 
fiduciary duty issues). One of the striking characteristics of the new "other constituency" 
statutes that purport to expand directors ' duties is that they almost never authorize 
nonshareholder constituencies to sue. See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1717 
(Purdon 1990 & Supp. 1993). 
62. One case involving an antitrust challenge to the NCAA's imposition of 
sanctions on a college football program offers a tantalizing glimpse at the issue. 
McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988). In McCormack, the Fifth Circuit 
rejected the plaintiffs' attempt to characterize their suit as a derivative action brought 
against the NCAA on behalf of their univers ity, due to the plaintiffs' failure to show that 
they had complied with the procwural prerequisites to derivative litigation. ld. at 1341. 
The court seems to have left open the possibility that student-athletes who do jump 
th rough the appropriate hoops could sue derivatively, although the court expressed doubts 
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university rathe:r than against NCAA dP.-eisionrna..~ers , the argument for 
vesting standing h1 the student-athlete is even stronger. Although the 
relationship between student-athletes a..11d a university is not a,;; direct as 
that of shareho!den; to a for-pro n fi rm, or members to a mut11al benefit, 
students have ii'"le kind of disctete financial st.a.cxe in a university that 
justifies giving them sta.11ding tO <::nforce university decisioruna.\:ers' 
fiduciary dutie.s. Some courts have based student standing to s:u.e 
universities on this tbeory.63 
Even more than in other ;-;ontexts, comts' tre.atm:mt of tJ1e standing 
issue seems likely to turn on th~ir condusio11 as to whBL~er NC~Ai\ 2:.nd 
university decisiomnakers mve a fiducimy du ty to student-ar.hletes. 
Because student-au1letes' gdevamccs tend to i.Iwolve mistre2.tment sp0cific 
to student-athletes rather than dahns of general misrnanagement, courts 
u'lat recognize a duty to student-athletes would probably also grant 
student-athletes standing to enforce it. 
In his paper ior th is conference, Professor Remington argttes iliat 
student-athletes should negotiate explicit contractual protections during the 
recruiting process, and that universities should in tum offer express 
contractual protections to their recruits . For instance, a university might 
promise to extend the student-athlete's scholarship in the event her athletic 
eligibility expires, or to finance attendance of SUllli11e r school. 64 One 
effect of focusing on the contractual nature of the student--athlete's 
relationship with her university is that it underscores both the role of 
fiduciary duty and the arguments I have just made for giving student-
athletes standing. 
The issue of student-atllletes' ability to contract with a university 
raises two related concerns. First, even when the parties have equal 
bargaining power, if the relationship is complex , t..hey often will fail to 
specify all the terms of their contract. One can easil y imagine student-
athletes failing to insist that surnr:ner school tuition be included ln theif 
scholarships, for instance. Second, al l except the most highly sought after 
stadent-athletes are at a significant bargaining disadvantage as compared 
to a university . 
as to whether students have standing vis-a-vis their university. 
63. See, e.g., Jones v . Grant, 344 So . 2d 1210 (Ala. 1977) (students and facu lty 
have standing to bring class action against trustees); Montclair Nat '! Bank & Trust Co. 
v. Seton Hall College, 217 A.2d 897 (N .J . Super . Ct. Ch . Div. 1966) (students have 
standing to sue); see also Developments, S'Apra note 18, at 1606. The most import.ant 
obstacle to standing in many of these cases is 5tate statutOliJ law sug;sesting that only th·t: 
attorney general has authority to bring su it against the tmstees of a charitable 
organization. By allowing student-athletes to sue, the courts would effe.::tivdy expand the 
standing provision . 
64. Remington, S !lpra note 36, at 768 . 
1995:669 Perspectives on Student-Athletes 689 
Fiduciary duty is a clCJ.ssic response to each of these problems. 
According to one view of fiduciary duty, its principal role in the 
corporate law context is to fi ll in terms that the parties have omitted from 
their contract. 65 A very different view suggests that fiduciary duties 
should be imposed when the parties have unequal bargaining power or 
lack an arm's length relationship. 66 
Characterizing fiduciary duty in th is way strongly reinforces the case 
for recognizing student-athletes' standing . '\11fnether one sees fid uciary 
duty as mechanism for filling gaps in the studenHtthlete' s contract , or as 
an obligation university or NCAA decisionmakers owe based on the 
nature of their relationship wiL-, student-ati.letes, the duty ru ns directly to 
student-athletes and can be seen as quasi-contractual ir.. character. From 
this perspective, student-athletes are precisely the parties who should have 
standing to enforce such a duty. 
C. The Procedural Prerequisites for Bringing Fiduciary Duty Litigation 
Having suggested that NCAA and university decisionmakers may 
owe a fiduciary duty that student-athletes should have standing to enforce, 
I now consider the procedural requirements a student-athlete must satisfy 
in order to enforce the duty. The key threshold issue is whether the suit 
is derivative or direct. Corporate law defines a shareholder's suit as 
derivative if the harm in question runs to the corporation as a whole, as 
occurs when the directors of a firm mismanage its assets. 67 If the suit 
is derivative, the shareholder must first demand that the corporation bring 
the suit, or al lege that demand is excused, since technical ly it is the 
corporation that has been harmed .68 A shareholder who is harmed 
directly, on the other hand , can sue without fi rst clearing these procedural 
hurdles. 
65. See, e.g., FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. F ISCHEL, T HE ECONOMlC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 92 (1991). 
66 . Lawrence Mitchell has argued, based on this perspective , that managers 
should owe a fiduciary duty to bondholders in the for-p rofit context, in part because 
bondholders are not represented in the negotiation process. Lawrence E. Mitchell , The 
Fairness Rights ojCorporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165 , 1177-86 (1990) . 
67. Harm to the corporation obviously impacts its shareho lders, but a 
shareholder' s injury is derivative, or indirect , to the extent that it principatly stems from 
her proportionate interest in the corporation's loss in value due to directorial 
mismanagement o t related problems. HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. A LEXANDER, LAWS 
OF CORPO RATIONS§ 360, at 1047-53 (3d ed . 1983). 
68. Some states impose additional prerequisites to derivative litigation , such as 
requiring plaintiffs to post security fo r expenses . See, e.g. , N. Y. Bu:.; . C ORP. LAW§ 627 
(McKinney 1986). 
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A student-aG1lete who wishes to enfotc1:~ a fiduciary duty rnight often 
be abie to characterize her suit as dirE:ct zmd tlms avo id t..lJ e procedural 
obstacies to suing derivatively. A :3tuder;i·-athiete whose eligibility has 
been restricted by the NCAA or who.:.e university refuses to finance 
summer school, for instance, has suffer•::d an injury L'l-Jat is direct rather 
than common to all student-atJil etes. Articulating the claim in quasi-
contractual terms-as arising out of the s ttdent-at:11ete's contract wit.h the 
NCAA or her l . .miversity-rei:nforc::-;s the ~:rgument that the student has 
suffered an injury specific to herself IT: one could argue that nearly 
every claim involving NClu\ or 1.miv0rs\ty decisionma.l<ers ' treatment of 
a student-athlete would be direct; ooJy 1£' Cc1e student-athlete sought to 
allege general mismanagemeDt oi' r+-~l./~ ;) ; rmiversity zssBts would her 
claim qualify as derivati'!e. 69 
However, some student-athlete ei~. ~:dle:nges to i<ICAA action might be 
at least partially derivative in nat:;.u ;; . T'h;; f',JCAA's prohibition on 
compensating student-athlet.es is a good example. 11lis restriction 
arguably affects al l (or at least a wide range ot) student-athletes, so that 
a challenge to the restriction as violating tbe NCAA's duty to student-
athletes may be characterized as derivative . 
In the corporate context, derivative litigation raises a problem that 
would prove similarly vexing if a student-athlete's suit against NCAA or 
university decisionmak:ers were found to be derivative: the directors of a 
corporation are the actors who will respond to a shareholder's demand, 
and thus will decide whether to pursue or terminate the suit; yet their 
motives are questionable given that they usual ly are the subjects of the 
suit. 70 Even if the board of directors delegates the decision to a special 
litigation committee limited to directors 'Nho are not implicated in the 
suit, the committee is likely to be sympaL'letk to the defendant directors. 
As a result, the directors may not only weed out frivolous suits, but also 
69 . This contention is arguably consistent with the distinctions courts draw in the 
for-profit context. While it is difficult to generalize about the cases, courts generally 
characterize allegations that the behavior in question has impaired a shareholder's voting 
or dividend rights as direct rather than derivative, even if all shareholders suffer a similar 
injury. HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 67, § 360, at 1048-49. One can argue, by 
analogy, that each student-athlete suffers a di.rect injury to her status as a student-athlete 
when the NCAA imposes regulations thai. adversely affect a wide range of student-
athletes. 
70. The literature on this and other c:leJivative issues discussed below is extensive. 
John Coffee was the flrst to explore many of the issues in a series of classic articles. See, 
e.g. , John C. Coffee, Jr ., Understo.n.ding the l 'laini'if.f's A!tomey: The lmplicatioi'.s of 
Economic Theory fo r PrivtJU Enforcement ojLaw Thm;t.gh Class and Derivative ActiortS, 
86 COLUM. L. REv . &59 (1986); John C . Coff.:'-e, Jr. , The Ur!faithjul Champion.: The 
Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareho!d::r Litigatio;1, LAW ,£{ CO!'HFJ'v!P. PrtaBS., Summer 1985, 
at 5. 
~ I 
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terminate potentially meritorious claims . One suspects t.'1at NCAA or 
university decis ionmakers would be similarly unsympathetic to litigation 
brought by a student-athlete. 71 
As an alternative to special comrnittees made up of "independent"' 
directors (i.e. , directors not narned .as defendB.nts) , commentators have 
suggested uiat a better approach in t.~e for-profh context might be to 
authorize eith·er court-appointed experts or a group of substantial 
shareholders to detennine whet.'ier a c:orpor8tion should pursue 
litigation. 72 Of the two approaches , using court-appointed experts seems 
more attractive for derivative litigation involving the NCAA, and may in 
fact offer real promise in this context. 73 A.s noted abovB, corr1111entators 
have criticized \--Ourt-appointe<i experts as being i:nsufnciently focused on 
shareholders' interest in maximizing pwfits given that dw experts are not 
themselves shan~holders . In liti.gatlm) involving student .. athletes and the 
NCAA, by contrMt, a committ:;;e •.vhh lliil h11.::entive J:o focus solely on the 
NCAA's bottom line would be misplaced . Given the NCAA's explicit 
commitment to stud ent-athletes,74 and the mult iplicity of its other 
objectives, outside experts (such as fo rmer student-athletes) might be at 
least as capable of evaluating a complaint as representatives of member 
institutions or NCAA decisionmakers , yet not so hampered by conflicting 
incentives. 
71. Another problem that would arise if a suit agaii1st NCAA decisionmakers were 
characterized as derivative is the uncertainty of whether the NCAA, because it is an 
unincorporated association, could be sued derivatively under Kansas law. See supra note 
16; infra note 83. This uncertainty reinforces the value of suing dire<:tly rather than in 
a derivative capacity. 
72. Both would ensure a less interested decis ionmaker, but each also has 
signiticant downsides . The prob lem with shareholders' committees is that a firm's largest 
shareholders may be unwilling to serve due to inconvenience and the effect committee 
membership would have on their ability to buy and sell th;:: firm' s stock. Court-appointed 
experts are more willing to serve but, because they lack a fmancial interest in the ftnn, 
may not be as effective in advocating shareho lders' best i11terests as would someone who 
shares those interests . For a thoughtful discussion of both approaches, and a tentative 
suggestion that shareholders' committees might improve on the existing regime, see 
Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of lns tilUtional Shareholder 
Activism, 79 GEO. L. REv. 445 (1991); see also Frank lin A. Gevurtz, Who Represents 
the Corporation: In Search of a Beller Method for Determining the Corporate Interest in 
Derivative Suits, 46 U , PriT. L P.EV. 265, 321-25 (1 985) (arguing for court-appointed 
litigation panel) . 
73. The most obvious analogue to a 3hareholders' committee for suits involving 
the NCA/1. vvouid be a commiUee comprised of representat ives of seven member 
i.r1stitutions. Such a committee raises conc;~ms about its members' incoentives, which may 
include !! competitive i;1terest i.n the p•jnishment o f another memb·er or , on the other hand , 
the fear of futu re NCAA scrutiny of their own athletics department. 
74. See sHpra note 34 and accompanying text. 
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This approach would obviously add to the cost of the der ivative 
strategy, but it would give student-athletes the benefit of a disinterested 
decis ionma.ker in the event tn'1eir suits were defined as derivative. 
D. Fiduciary Duty in Action: Its Promise and Limit.:ltfcr.s 
! have argt!ed that none of the most immediate obstacles to a 
fiduciary duty approach is insuperable. An important question that still 
remains , and to which I now return, is whether this approach would 
effect iv.e! y protect studenHJ.thletes. 
I have already noted an important limitation on fiduciary duty 
litigation: because cour!.S are poorly situated to second-guess NCAA 
decisionmaking , they ~Jmost certainly would defer in many si tuations to 
NCAA and university decisiorunakers' substantive decisions, much as they 
do in duty-of-care corporate law cases. 75 Yet the likely extent of judicial 
deference should not be overstated . First, even in duty-of-care cases, 
courts can provide meaningful scrutiny of the decisionmaking process and 
may strike down a decision if the procedures that led to it were flawed. 76 
Second, many and perhaps most of the suits brought by student-athletes 
would resemble duty of loyalty rather than duty-of-care suits, given the 
conflicts of interest created by NCAA and university decisionmakers' 
financi al interest in limiting student-athlete compensation and mobility.77 
Courts' willingness to play an active role in cases involving a conflict of 
interest suggests that fiduciary duty theories could offer meaningful 
protection for some student-athletes . 
To appreciate how the fiduciary duty approach might work, consider 
an illustration . Suppose that a men' s footbal l player who has completed 
75. Courts already have afforded broad deference to schools and other educational 
organizations sued on educational malpractice and related grounds. See, e.g., Ross v. 
Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 414-15 (7th Cir. 1992) (describing reasons for deference 
and citing cases). It is important to keep in mind, however, that the relationship between 
a student-athlete and a university is very different from the relationship between a non-
athlete student and the university, given the univers ity's close control over student-
athletes' lives and the fmancial benefits some student-athletes bring to the university . See 
University of Colo. v. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d 629 (Colo. 1993) (describing extent of 
university regulation of student-athletes' lives). 
76. For prominent recent examples irl the for-profit context, see CEDE & Co. v. 
Technico lo r, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993) (directors exercised inadequate care in 
approving merger); Smith v. Van Gorkom , 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (same). 
77. Delaware courts have applied enhanced scrutiny of for-profit corp<Jration 
takeovers when directors have a conflict of interest but have not engaged in classic self-
dealing. See , e.g. , Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 
34 (Del. 1994). A somewhat similar level of review-Qne which at a minimum entails 
a searching scrutiny of the decisionmaking process- would be appropriate in the NCAA 
and member institution context. 
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his athletic eligib ility needs one more year to complete his degree, but his 
university refuses to extend his scholarsh ip for the final year. Using a 
fiduciary duty approach , the student-at~lete might allege that the 
university ' s refusal to extend his scholarship con.stitt1tes a breach of duty, 
and ask that th0 court issue injunctive relief requiring the university to 
finance his tin- . year. ln making his case, the student might point out 
that the NCAA constitution emphasizes NCAA (and by implication, 
1 > > • ) d > > ak , b1 • • ... ' ed . al m;moer ms'W':utmn · eclswmnc · ers o 11gat1on to rtuther ucat10n 
' > > 7" h ' . . . . . . ''"' . l . OOJectrves; ~ t1 f\t tne 11rrrve:rstty ms1st.s to 1ts recm1ts luat It t<.t.ces Jts 
educational r~-3poJJsibiEties seriously (w.1d perhaps made a11 explicit 
promise w that :::fL}ct); and that refusing to extend ·d1e scholarship is 
l 11 . > • 1 .• d . 1 . . ~ . 11 . wno.1y mcoc:G~s;:~; ,i.t w~to H1e e1: ucat10na m1sswn or mterco eg1ate 
athletics . in view of the univers ity' s obvnous conflict of interest-saving 
costs by termiD?,ting <::.he schd arship a year eariier-2 court might well 
~a- c-o ·t' '> '( •' .-· • ,. -.:., :.-• · ~:~,. ~J;:. ; • _lrc 'b.,.P. hed >t-.. • • 1 '· ~;;;. f..,~- .!1cc. rJk : ,\t:!~· -- · ! C>hJ u...,CaSlOnma,.._,_.r::; ,,_ac !.welT CUty . 
One caveat is in order: the parameters of the fidu ciary duty 
necessarily would vary depending on the student-athlete and sport in 
question . Signifkantly different expectations are created in different 
contexts-the most obvious disparity in expectations appearing between 
revenue-producing sports and other sport_s. These differences highlight 
the intriguing parall els between a fiduciary duty theory and a student-
athlete' s contract-based arguments that the university owes her an implied 
duty of good faith. In a much-cited recent case involving a Creighton 
University basketbal l player, the Seventh Circuit suggested that a 
university did in fact owe such a duty, at least to the extent it had made 
express promises to the student-athlete.79 In the example discussed 
above, this approach might, like fiduciary duty, be a basis for liability if 
78 . At the univers ity level, courts have held that the letter of intent and related 
documents create a conti'actual relationship between the student-athlete and the university . 
Ross, 957 F.2d at •HO; Colorado Seminary v . NCAA, 570 F.2d 320 (lOth Cir. 1978); see 
Michad J. Cozzillio , The Athletic Scholarship and the College National Leiter of Intent: 
A Contract by Any Other JVar~~e, 35 WAYNE L. REv. 1275 (1989). 
79. Ross, 957 F.2d at 41 7 (rejecting negligence claims such as educational 
malpractice, but concluding t}mt Illinois wo uld recognize a claim based on express 
promise) . T im Davis has expiored and argued for the implied CDntract duty approach in 
several recent article>. Timothy Davis, Student-Athlete Prospective &onomic Interests: 
Contractual Dimensions, 19 T. MARS!--I.ALL L. REv. 585 (1994); Timothy Davis, 
Intercollegiate Athletics: Competing Models and Conflicting Realities, 25 R UTGERS LJ. 
269 (1994) (hereinafter Davis, lil!ercollegia:e Athletics]; see also Harold B. Hilborn, 
Comment, Swdent-Athlet::s end Judiciallncons istency: Establishing a Duty to Educate as 
a !Weans of Fostering M.za;;ingfi;l R.ejorr;1 of Intercollegiate Athletes, 89 Nw. L. REv. 741 
(1 995) (arguing for contractu!l.] duty or, ti1 the alternative , that student-athletes be given 
full employment b;onefits). 
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the university had made express promise-s to h'le football player 
concerning its financial com . rnitment to his education. 
In fact , the contract-based duty of good faiu'1 and fiduciary duty seem 
likely to lead to similar analyses in a wide range of cases. 00 There are, 
however, several important differences between them. One advantage of 
implied contract is that it would entail fewer procedural uncertainties, 
such as the stand ing issues discussed earlier. On the ot~er hand, fiduciary 
duty does not require the university to have made &'1 express promise, and 
it can be used to scrutinize the university's decisionmaking process, rather 
than just the substance of its actions. 
Tne fiduciary duty approach also seems far more promising if the 
student-athlete's grievance is against NCAA decis ionmakers rather than 
her university, given that the NCAA doe.s not have a direct contractual 
relationship with student-athletes. To appreciate how the fiduciary duty 
example might play out with respect to the NCAA, consider another 
example. Suppose the Presidents Cormnission drafted and sponsored 
legislation prohibiting universities from paying student-athletes a st ipend 
to encourage them to attend surnmer school, and the legislation was 
passed at the annual convention . A student-athlete could attempt to show 
flaws in the decisionmaking process, such as the Commission's failure to 
consider evidence suggesting that revenue sports athletes cannot 
realistically graduate unless they attend summer school and that the 
graduation rate for these athletes is far lower than for other students (and 
perhaps student-athletes). The student-au1lete might also focus on any 
obvious conflicts of interest that might have skewed the Presidents 
Commission' s decisionmaking process, and argue that the process was 
flawed as a result. 
In contrast to negative forms of scrutiny such as antitrust review, 
fiduciary duty litigation might even help to create and clarify the 
affirmative obligations universities and the NCAA owe to student-
athletes. 81 For instance, even if many of the suits proved unsuccessful 
80. The same is true in the for-profit context. Bondholders whose contracts fail 
to protect them against adverse developments have attempted to advance both fiduciary 
duty and implied contractual duty arguments. See Marcel Kahan, The Qualified Case 
AgaiTLSt Mandatory Tenns in Bonds , 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 565, 587 (1995) (citing cases). 
81 . Peter Carstensen and Paul 0 lszowka argue that N C/>.A regulation should take 
place at the national level due to the "home court adw.ntage" concerns that can undermine 
state decisionmaking. Peter C. Carstensen & Paul Olszowka, Antitrust Law, Student-
Athletes and the NCAA: Limiting the Scope and Conduct of Private &onomic Regulation, 
1995 WIS. L REv. 545, 560. These concerns are far less serious with respect to judicial 
review of fiduciary duty claims than in other contexts. Under ordinary conlict-of-law 
principles, or by analogy to the internal affairs doctrine in for-profit corporate law, courts 
would apply Kansas law in cases involving NCAJ.\. decisionmakers given that the NCAA 
is located in Kansas . Litigation against university decisionmakers would be decided by 
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on the merits, fiduciary duty challenges might force NCA.J·\ a.11d university 
decisionmaken; to articulate more clearly how they view their educational 
and athletic responsibilities to student~athletes. 
It is importallt not to overstate u'1e likely effectiveness of a fiduciary 
duty approach. As notE--d earlier , because courts are poorly situated to 
second-guess NCAA ancl university decisionrnakers, they would often 
defer to NCAA and university exp,;rtise. Nevert.l-J.e1ess, fiduciary duty 
suits could offer a slgnificank additiom>J protection to student-athletes . 
E. Why Haw~ We So Rarely Seen the Fiducimy l)ury Approach in 
.r:4ction? 
The suggestion that fiduciary duty 1itiga.tion may irnprove on existing 
legal strategies for stnder:t-athletes , and thus tl:wt this corporate law 
perspective offers a welcome 2-.ddition to student-athletes' existing legal 
protections, raises an obvious question: why have litigants suing the 
NCAA so rarel y invoked this device in the past? Wh y do they routinely 
look to constitutional law , a.ntitrust, or their state legislatures instead? 
One possibility is that , even in the absence of any practical obstacles 
to suing on fiduciary duty grounds, these suits would not be effective 
because of limitations such as courts' likely deference to NCAA 
decisionrnaking and the possibil ity courts would conclude that NCAA and 
university decisionmakers simply do not owe an enforceable duty to 
student-athletes. Yet, the concern over a relatively low probability of 
success seems an incomplete explanation of the dearth of fiduciary duty 
suits against the NCAA , and I have suggested several contexts where the 
approach might prove effective. 82 
The NCAA 's unincorporated status creates additional uncertainties. 
As discussed in Pait I, unincorporated associations are not legal entities. 
Because of this, and because derivative litigation involves state rather than 
federal law, the NCAA could not be sued derivatively unless a state 
courts in the university's state , but both the student-athlete and the university would, in 
a sense , hail from that state . As a result, judges and juries would seem as likely to 
identify with even an out-of-state student-athlete as with university decisionmakers . 
Moreover, while state-by-state case law arguably could create problems such as a lack of 
uniformity, this has not been a major problem in other corporate contexts; and federal 
courts applying a federal law do not always pwvide uniform decisions, as the antitrust 
cases themselves make clear . 
82. Because derivative plaintiffs are ordinarily requ ired first to demand that a 
corporation (or in this case, association) pursue the Litigation before pursuing it 
themselves, the possible time delay might be seen as a disincentive to suing derivatively. 
But plaintiffs have been able to ~ue immediately in the corporate context by alleging that 
demand is unnecessary because futile. ]Viore.over, the problem arises only if the student-
athlete ca11not characterize her cause of action as direct rather thfiil derivative. 
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statute or cas~ l3.VlJ aut.non.zeo Ht1gatw n oy or agamst an 2-SSOClatHm:" 
Yet, as noted earlier, student-athletes could avoid this uncertaint:," by 
characterizing their suits as d irect rather than derivative, and emphasizing 
the quasi-contractual nature of the claim. 
Anolher possibility , of course, is that lawyers :have not yet thought 
to focus on fiduciary duty. The one remaini.ng obstac1 e is basic, bJ..ri may 
also be particularly impor&:tnt: the fiduciary duty approach \vould funct ion 
effectively only if snldent-att1ietes were able to obt2in lawyers. I\t~ost 
student-achletes C2J1not afford to pay l~rwyers themselves. \Vb il~ the 
obvious alternative in such a situation L for attorneys to taJc;; promi:)ing 
cases on :;;ontingency as they do in the for-profit context, 1!:1e contingency 
approach rnight not work for student-ati1bte,s' suits . .h1 contr21..st to 
corporate derivative Htiga;lts, ,,;vho frequently se;::~ :~ monetJxy damages, 
student-athl-etes VJOJJid frequently be se-ekh1g inj;.Flcti'ie relief and would 
often have extr;:;ordinary difficulty proving :m.onc;;tai"y darnages. 
Yet student-athletes' inability to obtain representation should not be 
overstated . First, some cases do involve or could be framed in terms of 
read ily ascertainable dollai amounts, such as the cost of a final yeas of 
education u'1at a university refuses to finance after an athlete' s eligibility 
expires . Second, student-athletes could bring some .suits as class actions 
(for instance, a challenge to an NCAA eligibility mle) and argue for 
attorneys fees in connection witt'! a settlement or successful verd ict. 
Final ly, some student-athletes can affo rd representation, and other cases 
may be particularly good candidates for pro bono representation. The 
attorneys fees concern could be easily addressed through legislation 
requir ing the NCAA and member institutions to pay successful plaintiffs' 
attorneys fees . But even in the absence of such a step , t1 e fiduciary duty 
approach appears to offer promise. 
83 . Interestingly, Kansas, the NCAA.'s home state, appears to contemplate that 
derivative litigation may be brought against a Kansas associat ion Section 60-223a of the 
Kansas statutes, which sets forth the requirements for suing derivatively, refers to a 
"derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to enforce a right of 
a corporation or of an unincorporated association." KAN . STAT. ANN. § 60-223a (1994) 
(emphasis added) . Yet it is unclear vvhether the provision i.;l question qualifies as an 
enab ling statute affirmatively autho rizing derivative litigation i..-r-;olving the NCAA. The 
Supreme Court of Kansas, for instance, construed KAN. STAT. ANN . § 60-223a q uite 
narrowly in Kansas Private Club A.ss'n v . Londerholm , 402 P .2d 891 (Kan . 1965), 
rejecting arguments that it gives an association the authority i.o sue on beha lf of its 
members. See also ?v1 urray v . Sevier, 156 f.R.D . 235, 242 (D. Ka:n . 1994) (noting, i..r1 
a case decided under Alabama law, that § 60-223 has been construed as not crcati..-lg a 
right to sue or be sued in association name). 
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IV . .EXTERl'l!V~ CORPOfVHE GOVERJ'\JANCE l3SUES : THE NCAA AS A 
SELF-REGULATING 0RGANEAT10N 
·rile previous Parts considered whether ii1~er.na1 corporate governance 
mechanisnns might give student-athletes a gre.a-i:er voice in and protection 
with respect to NCAA and member institution decisiom:naking . I shift in 
this Par-i: from a discussion of internal governanc,e to a consideration of 
'he role that a more dramatic approach, e- i:ern~iJ oversight, might play in 
a dr~ssing concems of student-athletes. 
'fbe antitmsi: laws provide one possible source of external oversight. 
Students and universities have al ready used a ntitrust 1aw in several high-
profile case,s against the NCAA, 34 a.Gd Pet~r Carstensen and Paul 
Olszowka defend ii: in their articie for Vh1s syrnposiuxn as the most 
l ., l I • ~ j • "'T' -., 1\ ' ' ' ' gj ] 'll p ausw e mecn:o:msm wr regu,atmg hil..I'""P' ?\C:tlVlUes : i Wh retum to 
ts'le role of antitmst later in this Part. 
But ::u1titrust is not the only possible sou:rc~ of external review of the 
NCAA. This Part examines the possibility of adopting a framework 
derived from the structure currently used to regulate the stock exchanges. 
This structure, \-vhich was first implemented pursuant to the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934,86 grants the Securities Exchange Commission 
extensive authority to regulate the exchanges, but leaves much regulation 
to the exchanges tt'lemselves. Consistent with their largely autonomous 
role, the exchanges are registered as "Self Regulatory Organizations" 
under the 1934 Act. 87 
I argrw in this Part that a similar arrangement, coupling government 
regulation with a relatively hands-off approach to day-to-day governance, 
might also make sense for the NCAA. The analysis wili suggest that 
securities-style regulation offers important adva\1tages over bou'l the 
internal corporate governance mechanisms previously discussed an.d the 
antitrust approach. The most obvious limitation of such an approach is 
the significant reform it would entail . 
The Part begins by describing the regulatory framework used to 
oversee the exchanges, and detail s a few similarit ies between the NCAA 
and an exchange. I then consider how securities-style regulation might 
84 . See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
85. Carstensen & Olszowka, supra note 81. 
36. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch, 404, 4·8 Stat gg 1 (codified as amended 
a.t 15 U.S. C. §§ 78a-78hh) (1988)). 
87 . Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 6, 15 U.S .C. § 78 f. As noted earlier, 
Self Regulatory Organization status is not limited to exchanges. The National Association 
of Securities Dealers, for instance, is an association of securities professionals. For 
convenience, l v!ill sometimes usc "exchange" and "SRO" interchangeably, since the 
exchanges' status most closdy parallels the NCAA's. 
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resolve controversial issues involving student-au1letes, contrast the 
approach to external review m1d.er t.l-Je antitrust laws, and brietly describe 
the practical barriers to adopting a system of securities-style regulation . 
A. The Analogy Benveen th.e NCAA and the Exchanges 
Tne Securities Exchange Act of 1934 gives the SEC authority to 
regulate each entity registere-d as &"1 SRO. The SEC's role, as defined in 
the Act, is to promote "'fair compet ition" a.rnong u'le various 
constituencies of t!'1e exchanges, and to make sure that the exchai"lges take 
appropriate steps to monitor for and prevent fraudulent practices. gs The 
SEC's charge also includes related, :mbsid iary goals, such as ensuring 
"fair representation "' on the bom·ds of the exchanges. 
Alu1ough the SEC's power to achieve its antifraud &'1d pro-
competition objectives was originall y more constrained , the Comrnission 
now has pervasive regulatory power. ln addition to being able to respond 
to rules proposed by an exchange, for instance, the SEC can d irectly alter 
an existing rule or promulgate an SEC rule with respect to a given 
issue. 89 If the Commission views exchange regulation as inadequate, it 
can force an exchange to enact a new rule.~ The SEC's response to the 
rise of the options market is perhaps the best example of this last power. 
As the options market dramatically expanded in the 1970s, many 
observers feared that the absence of regulation created the potential for 
widespread fraud . The SEC responded to the exchanges' failure to 
develop safeguards by imposing a moratorium on new options until the 
exchanges proposed a framework for overseeing this market. 91 
Despite its wide-ranging authority, the SEC has traditionally 
permitted the exchanges to retain a large measure of autonomy, 
intervening relatively infrequentl y. 92 Although commentators have often 
88. !d. § 6(b)(5), 15 U .S.C . § 78f(b)(5); id. § 15A(b)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 
78(o)(A)(b)(6) ; 6 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURrriES REOtTLATION 2788-93 (3d 
ed. 1990). 
89. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(c), 15 U.S.C . § 78s(c). For an 
excellent overview and discussion of the SEC's powers under the 1934 Act, see David A. 
Lipton, The SEC or the Exchange: Who Should Do What, and When? A Proposal to 
Allocate Regulatory Responsibilities for Securities Markets, 16 U .C. DAVIS L. REv . 527, 
531-37 (1983). 
90. See , e.g., Rule llb-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.11b-5 (1994) . 
91. Lipton , supra note 89, at 550-54 . 
92. See, e.g., Timothy S. Hardy , Note, Infonnal Bargaining Process: An Analysis 
of the SEC's Regulation of :he New York Stock Exchange, 80 YALE L.J . 811 (1971) 
(suggesting that the SEC i§ generally prompte-d to act by scandals or the threat of antitrust 
scrutiny of the exchanges, and criticizing the informal processes the SEC and the New 
York Stock Exchange ol'Len employ). 
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called fo r a more active SEC role, most acknowledge that collaboration 
between the exchanges and th~ SEC ofiers, at least in theory, important 
advantages over exclusive regulation by u'1e SEC . Not only would direct 
SEC regulation seriously ta;i the SEC's adrninistrative resources, but self 
regulation has the .advantage of tapping into the expertise of the market 
professionals who comprise an exchange. 93 
A discussion of self regulation in the securities industry is not likely 
to immediately bring the NCAA to mind. Yet even a brief comparison 
reveals striking parallels. 'n"1e NCAA currently acts very much like a self 
regulatory organization: it establishes rules for its members, regulates 
NCAA athletic competition, and disciplines r.a:1embers t1'1at fail to adhere 
to NCAA sumdards. .[f Congress were to assert some form of regulatory 
control over the NCA.A, mo-deiing the frznnework on the dual system used 
• • • 1 ' rl ''r >"l.-. ' • d f b ~ h m secuntJE\S 1aw womu oner tue same ::or1 s o enents as exc ange 
regulation . Most irrlpm-tantly, treating the NCAA as a self regulatory 
organization would ieave the business of nmning college athletics to those 
with the requisite expertise, yet would enable regulators to step in to 
correct perceived inadequacies of NCAA oversight. 
In addition to the theoretical attractions of treating the NCAA like a 
self-regulating exchange, this approach also draws support from a 
consideration of the remarkable historical and practical similarities 
between these superficially dissimilar organizations. Both the NCAA and 
the exchanges were originally set up and run as unincorporated 
associations, and appear to have foregone incorporation at least in part to 
minimize the likelihood of judicial interference with their internal 
affairs. 94 By the time iawma.kers established federal authority to regulate 
market operations during the New Deal, the New York Stock Exchange 
(and to a lesser extent the other exchat1ges) was so well-entrenched that 
displacing its regulatory rol e altogether would have been nearly 
impossible as a practical matter. 95 
The NCAA seems quite similar in this respect. Like the New York 
Stock Exchange, L1e NCAA. has overseen college athletics for so long that 
recognizing its continuing role may be a prerequisite for any effort to 
provide for external regulatory review over intercollegiate athletics. 96 
93. See, e.g., Jennings, supra note 16; Lipton, supra note 89; Sam S. Miller, The 
Self-Regulation of the Securi.ties i1ilarkets: A Critical Etamirzation, 42 WASH. & LEE L. 
REv. 853 (1985). 
94. Jennings, supra note 16, at &53 n.2. For a more complete discussion of the 
NCAA's use of the association form, S<".AO supra part L 
95. SP.LlGMA.t'l, s1;,pra note 45 ; Jennings, supra note 16, at 669-70. 
96. As noted at the outset of this Article, the NCAA was established in 1905, and 
has long regubted nearly all of collegiate athletics. See supra note 1 and accompanying 
text. 
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External regulation of the NCAA would obviously have a somewhat 
different focus than SEC regulation of the exchanges, yet one can easily 
imagine what its general mission would be. In addition to an SEC-like 
a.r1tifraud objective of ma.lcing sure that the NCAA adequately polices 
member institutions ' compliance with NCi\A mles , regulators would also 
scrutinize NCAA decisionrr.w.king (as well as the actions of its member 
universities) from both economic and educational perspectives. 
Regulators would address econo:mic issues such as the question whether 
NCA .. A regulations bear an appropriate relationsh ip to the NCAA's stated 
objective of "preserving amatewrism. ,., From an educational standpoint, 
regulators would ensure that the NCAA takes appropriate steps to 
integrate educational goals into intercollegi.?,te athletics . In each of these 
areas , regulators would pay particular attention to the role and 
perspectives of student-athletes . 
As in the exchctnge context, even an effective securities-style 
framework for NCAA regulation would face inevitable limitations. If 
regulators defer too much to SRO expertise, they may fail to correct any 
deficiencies in SRO regulation. Commentators have frequently criticized 
the SEC's regulation of the exchanges along these lines, pointing out that 
the SEC tends to exercise active and visible oversight only in the face of 
a public scandal or other crisis. 97 On the other hand, aggressive 
regulators run the risk of overly burdening the organization they are 
charged with overseeing. Yet despite these I imitations, one can easily 
imagine an important role for dual regulation in the NCAA context, as I 
discuss in detail below. 93 
97. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 93, at 861-63; Marianne K. Smythe, Government 
Supervised Self-Regulation in the Securities Jndustly and the Antitrust Laws: Suggestions 
for an Accommodation, 62 N.C. L. REV. 475, 499 (1984) (describing federal courts' 
perception of the inadequacies of SEC regulation). 
98. Market forces counteract some of the regulatory deficiencies in the stock 
exchange context. The New York Stock Exchange fa.ces intense competition from both 
the other exchanges and market substitutes that have emerged in recent years. See 
Jonathan Macey & Hideki Kanda, The Stock Exchange as a Firm: The Emergence of Close 
Substitutes for the New York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1007 
(1990). These market forces give the New York Stock Exchange an incentive to regulate 
efficiently, even if the SEC seems to have dropped the ball. Similarly, the NCAA may 
be constrained to a certain extent by the professional sports leagues. In theory at least, 
fans may tum to other sports if NCAA decision makers mismanage intercollegiate athletics. 
Yet the market constraints on the NCAA seem significantly less forceful. The NCAA 
(and the television networks) schedule the most vis ible NCAA sports so as not to compete 
directly with professional sports, for ilJStance . More.-:wer, whatever constraints do exist 
may not benefit many student-athletes. In fact, the professional sports l~gues may even 
exacerbate student-athletes' relative powerlessness with resp--..,ct to some issues, since pro 
sports indirectly benefit from limits on compensation and other restrictions imposed on 
student-athletes at the collegiate level. 
I 
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B. The Role ThAt External Oversight .Mfight Play in the NCAA 
Having described external oversight in gen~;ral terrns, it is useful to 
examine in more detail what externBJ regulation of the NCAA might look 
like. This section considers how securit ies-style regulation might 
influence NCAA decisionmaking with respect to several of the most 
prominent issues affecting (\n often confl.ktLng ways) student-athletes. 
One of the most cxmtroversial issues in recen.t years has been th.e 
question of student-athlete compensat~on. While the NCAA has long 
defended its stringent limitations on compeDsat\on :::~s crucial to preserving 
"'amateurismt? at the collegiate level, cr i.tics have repeatedly pointed out 
the irony that these unpaid athl ;;tes g-<;;n<:.'Flt.e huge revenues for the NCAA 
and its mernber institutions, as well 8\S the hardsh ips the NCAA's 
restrictions impose on poor student-athlete.:; in pMticula.r . Yet these 
complaints have largely fa..llen on deaf e~xs. 
One can easily imagine how securities-style regulators might deal 
with this issue. ·while regulators could unilateraJ !y alter the NCAA's 
restrictions if they had roughly the same powers as the SEC, they would 
presumably first pressure the NCAA to implement new rules. By analogy 
to the SEC's approach in the options context, regulators might threaten 
to remove aJl restrictions on compensation unless the NCAA devised a 
new approach to compensation-one that provided more flexibility on 
issues such as pocket money and summer jobs, for instance, but preserved 
the distinctions between intercollegiate and pro sports. The obvious 
advantage of this approach is that it would enable the regulator to defer 
to NCAA decisionmakers ' expertise rather than attempting to substitute 
its own judgment, yet force the NCAA to address compensation issues 
much more quickly than it is likely to do in the absence of external 
pressure. 99 
Other issues are sufficiently disconnected fro m the NCAA's expertise 
and stated purpose that regulators need not defer to NCAA 
decisionmaking. Consider, for example, the NCAA's rule terminating a 
football player's college eligibility if he makes himself available for the 
99. The informal nature of much SEC regulation is not attractive to all observers. 
For an extensive criticism of this asp=---ct of the self-regulation framework, see Hardy, 
supra note 92. As the analysis in the text suggests, I am significantly more optimistic 
about the efficacy of informal regulation. In my view, formalizing the regulatory process, 
as Hardy proposes, would undermine incremental change and would inevitably invite more 
res istance from the entity being regulated . 
l do not mean to suggest by the examples l discuss in this section, however, that 
regulators invariably would address and help solve the problems in question (though I 
suspect they often would, at least in high-profile situations). My aim is merely to show 
the role regulators could plll.y. 
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pro draft, regardless of whether a pro te;:.u-:n actual ly seiects him. J()(l As 
Carstensen a.tid Olszowka point out in their antitrust anal ysis , this rule 
bears no obvious relationship to the NCAA's intere.st in preserving 
amateurism. 101 By terminating eligibility as of the moment the athlete 
puts his name forward, the regu.lation simply tightefl..s the NCAA's rei.n...s 
on its labor supply without providing any offsetting benefit, since ma11.y 
athletes would forgo the draft rather t.han risk losing tlJ.eir remaining 
eligibility. An external regulator could either invalidate anticompethive 
regulat ions such as this on·e, or compel the NCAA to do so itseif. 
A third issue, gender equity and Title IX, implicates a mucb. broader 
cross-section of student-ath1etes u1a.'l compensation and draft issues, which 
primarily concern stude:nt-atl-:!letes who participate in Division 1-A :football 
and Division. I men's basketball. T itle IX has made clear that the 
NCAA's member institutions must provide equal opportunities for both 
men and women srudent-ath.ietes .w2 Tne NCAA's member institutions 
have tended to respond to th·e Title IX mandate in notably piecemeal 
fashion . Many have appeared to make only as many changes as are 
necessary to forestall Title IX litigation, rather than genuinely to address 
gender equity issues. Only when faced with or as a result of actual 
litigation have some schools made sweeping changes. 103 
Equitable treatment of men and women student-athletes is an issue 
that NCAA decisionmakers should be ideally situated to address . 
100. 1994-95 NCAA MAiWAL art. 12.2.4.2; see also Ethan Lock, NCAA 
Eligibility Rules Send Braxston Banks Truckin', 20 CAP. U. L. REv. 643, 649 (1991) 
(criticizing draft rule as designed to benefit universities by discouraging student-athletes 
from making themselves available for draft). 
101. Carstensen & Olszowka, supra note 81, at 590. As my discussion of the 
draft issue suggests, securities-style regulation would parallel antitrust review on many 
issues-particularly those entailing a consideration of the competitive effect of NCAA 
rules. For a more detailed comparison (and contrast), see infra part IV .C . 
102. Notice that gender equity is Rn issue with respect to which student-athletes 
may have dramatically different interests . Equalizing men's and women's scholarnhips 
benefits student-athletes who participate in historically underfunded women's sports . 
Other student-athletes, on the other hand, generally those who play non-revenue men's 
sports, may view this equalization as a threat to their sport. See, e.g., Mi...lce Jensen, in 
Sports, Equity Still Is an Issue, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 28, 1994, at Al (comparing 
expenditures on men's and women's sports at six Philadelphia universities and de:Jcribing 
effects of efforts to equali'le them). 
103 . Professor George describes this pattern of response and courts' tendency to 
focus on the .. proportionality" of men 's and women's athletics programs ill her article for 
this conference. B. Glenn George, W'no Pays aP'.d VVho Plays: Defming Equality in 
[nJercollegiate Athletics, 1995 WIS. L. REv. 647 . For a detailed des.cription of recent 
litigation, see Diane Heckman, J'he F.xplosion of Tule IX Legal Activuy in Intercollegiate 
Athletics During 1992-93: Defining th~ "Equal Oppor!tmity" Standard, 1994 DET. C .L. 
REv. 953. 
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Unive rsities' :reluct:an>>e to ma k e dramatic changes 
unilatera!l ly-partkuiarly if the changes reduce fund ing of revenue sports 
such as footbal l and men's basketball-stems at least in part from a classic 
collective action problem. Even if an individual university wished to shift 
scholarships from men's football to women's spor'"LS, for instance, it might 
hesitate to take such a step tor fear that it would put the university at a 
competitiive disadvantage vis-a-vis other universities that failed to take 
similar steps .104 NCAA dedsiorunakers could theoretically address this 
problem by ir.-1posi:r1g a uniform obligation on all schools . The NCAA 
might al so experiment wit.h other ways of promoting gender equity, such 
as basing NCAA championships in some sport..s on the combined 
performance of the men's and •Nomen's teECms. 105 
In contrast to this theon;tka1 promise, :the NCAA's general response 
to the recent 'wave of Title DC and other discrimination suits against 
member institutions has been to articulate a general policy that members 
comply wiL1 these lav;s, but otherwise to ieave members largely to their 
own devices. 1(){j An external regulator might be a valuable antidote to 
NCAA decisionmakers' current failure to take more aggressive action. 
As wit.h compensation, a regulator could use its leverage to counteract the 
current resistance to developing a meaningful approach at the NCAA 
level. 
Notice that, in addition to replacing member institutions' existing ad 
hoc responses with a more consistent one, external regulation might also 
provide for better decisionmaking with respect to gender issues. Under 
existing law, courts have become the principal decisionmakers of gender 
equity disputes . Yet gender equity issues are quite complex, and rather 
than benefitting from a retroactive focus, require a forward-looking focus 
that courts are not particularly well-situated to provide. The advantage 
of external regulation is that it would force decisionmakers who have 
more expertise than courts on issues of impmtance to student-athletes to 
104. For a classic account of collective action concerns of this sott, which uses an 
illustration from competitive spnrts as a central metaphor, see Thomas C. Schelling, 
Hockey Helmets, Concealed Weapons, and Daylight Saving: A Study of Binary Choices 
with Externalities, 17 J . CONFLlCf REsoL. 381 (1973). 
105. See 'Jeorge, supra note 103, at 658 (discussing use of this approach in skiing 
championships as a means of avoiding zero sum perception that benefits to women's sports 
must come at the expense of men's sp-orts). 
106. Under its "Principle of Gender Equity," for instance, the NCAA states that 
u[I]t is the responsibility of each member institution to comply with Federal and state laws 
regarding gender equity." 1994-95 NCAA MANUAL art. 2.3.1. The NCAA Manual goes 
on to suggest that the NCA.A "should adopt legislation to enhance member institutions' 
compliance with applicable gender-equity laws." !d. art. 2.3.2. In addition, the NCAA 
has recently imposed a certification requirement, which requires each institution to 
conduct a self-study to address various issues, including gender equity. 
704 WISCONSIN LA \V REVIEW 
develop a plan in the first instance. One suspects that courts would tend 
to defer to the NCAA approach if an external regulator pressured NCAA 
decisionmakers to develop a meaningful response to gender equity 
concerns. 
A final issue fl1rther illustrates how securities-style regulation might 
make the NCAA more resp-onsive and effective in areas of concern to 
student-athletes. One of the most consistent criticisms of the NCAA and 
its member institutions is that they do not do enough to place educational 
objectives at the heart of intercoilegiate athletics. Itviany commentators 
have argued that the emphasis on education nmst occur at the institutional 
level, with universities providing academic oversight of their athletics 
departments and offering scholarships only to student-·atbletes who can 
reasonably be expected to succeed academically. 107 
While unilateral, institutional level reform is crucial, securities-style 
external regulation could play an important role in addressing educational 
objectives, and in doing so hel p to counteract the risk that individual 
universities whose administrators are not committed to change will 
subvert its effectiveness. External regulators could require NCAA 
decisionmakers to articulate specific educational responsibilities that a 
university would have to its student-athletes. Universities might be 
required, at least for revenue sport student-athletes, to extend a 
scholarship to include summer school, as well as the period after the 
student has completed her athletic eligibility. 103 The NCAA and its 
member institutions have already taken a few tentative steps to achieve 
educational objectives-some under congressional prodding-such as 
requiring athletic recruiters to disclose the university's graduation rate for 
student-athletes and related information to potential recruits. 109 An 
external regulator might speed this process, and force NCAA 
decisionmakers to focus much more explicitly on t..1e educational concerns 
of student-athletes. 
107. Professors Allison and Davis both make arguments of this sort in their papers 
for this conference. Allison, supra note 3; Davis, supra note 3. 
108. For a discussion of universities' refusal to give scholarship aid in these 
situations, see Remington, supra note 36. A regulator might also encourage the NCAA 
to play some role in defming the appropriate parameters of academic support services. 
For one possible model of academic supp01i services, see Davis, supra note 3, at 618-19 
(proposing that support services be overseen by an academic dean). 
109. Student Right-to-Know and Campus Security Act, Pub. L. No. 101-542, § 
104, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 2381 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1085, 
1092, 1094, 1232(g) (1988 & Supp. HI 1991)). 
• 
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C. Securities-Style Regulation as Co;npared to AntiTrust 
As i noted at the outset of this Part, one important mechanism for 
external regulation of NCAA decisionmaking ah:eady exists: the antitrust 
laws. In this section I return to antitrust in order to compare this fonn 
of external review to a frarne,..vork modelled on SEC oversight of the 
stock exchanges. The comparison is particula . rly important given the 
obstacles to implementating a securities-style framework, as the following 
section discusses. 
In many respects, the focus of a securities-Dtyle framework for the 
NCAA would parallel that of the antitmst l avv~;, much as it does in the 
stock exchange context. Like antitrust reg,ru lators, a:.nd as discussed 
earlier, a.'1 NCAA regulator 'lNOuld 5cmtiu1ize NCAA decisiorunaking to 
ensure that NCAA regulations bear an appropriate celationship to the 
NCAA's objective of providing a framework for aiTJateur intercollegiate 
athletic competition. In areas 1..vhere l'ICAA 1egulations arguably do not 
further this objective-such as its rules terminating the eligibility of 
student-athletes who make themselves available for the pro football 
draft-securities-style regulation and the antitrust laws both suggest that 
such unnecessarily anticompetitive regulations should be struck down. 110 
Yet securities-style regulation also offers several important 
advantages over antitrust review. First, antitrust scrutiny is primarily 
negative in nature; antitrust laws focus on whether coordination among 
private actors has an impermissibly anticompetitive effect, and strike 
down those actions that do. 111 By contrast, securities-style regulation 
not only addresses these concerns, but it also can be used to develop 
affirmative obligations. Perhaps the most obvious illustration of an 
affirmative external regulatory strategy among the examples we have 
considered is the enforcement of the NCAA's and universities' 
educational obligation to student-athletes. 'INhereas antitrust regulation 
would not have much to say about this responsibility , securities-style 
regulators could, as we have discussed, deci;ise (or prompt NCAA 
decisionmakers to devise) a framework for addressing educational issues 
of concern to student-athletes. 
110. See, e.g., Carstensen & Olszowka , supra note 31 , at 590. 
111. Carstensen and Olszowka recognize this limitation in their defense of antitrust 
scrutiny as the best available mechanism for externa l regulation of the NCAA. Jd. at 581. 
In fact, the limitations of antitrust seem even more significant than their relatively 
optimistic view of its W(ely efficacy would suggest, given courts ' relative reluctance to 
interfere with NCAA actions on antitrust grounds e;,cept in fairly egregious cases. See, 
e.g., Davis, Intercollegiate Athletes, supra note 79 , at 306-08 (describing cases rejecting 
antitrust challenges to various NCAA regulations) . 
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A second advantage of securitie.s-sty!e regulation is closely rel.ated. 
Even with respect to issues involving "'negative,., revie\v, st'".-eu:rities-style 
regulators arguably can employ a more mJlli'1Ced appro~.ch. Consider the 
issue of compensating athletes . H a court concluded that the NCAA 
regulations constituted an imperrniss ible restraint of trade under the 
antitrust laws, it ordinarily would simply invalidate t.1.e regulations , 
perhaps with in..structions as to what kinds of restrictions might be more 
likely to withstand an antitrust challenge. Ratl1er thai1 simply striking 
down the regulations, securitir..s-style regulators could vv·ork wit.h the 
NCAA and tap NCAA decisiomnakers' expertise in developing a more 
reasonable approach to compensation of student-athletes. 112 
This affirrD.ative, collaborative facet of securities-style reg-vJation also 
could play an important role in resolving issues not covere-.ri by antitrust 
law. Title IX issues involving student-athletes are illustrative in u'lis 
respect. As discussed ~arlier, securities-style reguiators could pressure 
NCAA decisionmakers to develop a coherent, overarching framework for 
addressing gender equity issues such as the question of what achieving 
equal opportunity for men's and women's athletics requires. 
While this analysis suggests that securities-style regulation 
theoretically offers several advantages over antitrust, I do not mean to 
suggest that the antitrust laws would prove irrelevant. As occurs with 
SEC regulation of the stock exchanges, antitrust scrutiny still could play 
an important role in settling issues that regulators have not addressed. 113 
In addition, the SEC often does not act until a scandal or the threat of 
antitrust chal lenge focuses attention on an issue. 114 Although some 
commentators see this as a flaw in SEC regulation, it also suggests that 
antitrust scrutiny is a desirable stimulant to regulatory intervention. 
D. Practical Obstacles to Securities-Style Regulation 
This Part began with a somewhat improbable analogy: the suggestion 
that the NCAA bears an intriguing resemblance to the New York Stock 
Exchange and the oL1er exchanges. I have attempted to show that the 
same regulatory strategy used in the exchange context could prove 
112. The SEC has played a similar role on occasion in the securities context. As 
discussed earlier, for instance, the SEC pressured the exchanges to develop regulations 
in response to concerns about misbehavior in the options markets. See supra note 91 and 
accompanying text. 
113. See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963) (insisting on 
an "analysis which reconciles the operation of both statutory schemes ... rather than 
holding one completely ousted"); Smythe, supra note 97 (proposing a framewo rk for 
integrating antitrust scrutiny with SEC reguiation of the exchanges). 
114. See supra note 92 . 
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remarkably effective in addressing issues of particular concern to student-
at'f}letes, and that it offers advantages even over external review under the 
a...J.titrust laws. Yet it is important to recognize both the costs and the 
potential obstacles to securities-style regulation. 
The direct costs of securities-style regulation are u1e costs of hiring 
new regulators and running a new enforcement office. In addition, 
securities-style regulation is onJy as effective as its administrators. As 
noted earlier, some commentators view SEC regulation of the exchanges 
a.s insufficiently vigilant. 
The more importar1t issue, however, is the political question of 
whether Congress would implement such <1 framework. Two observations 
illustrate the resistance such a proposal would face. First, in exploring 
tJw i!'!nalogy between the NCAA and the exchanges, 1 touched only briefly 
on the conditions t."lat led to SEC oversight of th.e exchanges. The 
.securities acts were passed in the wake of the massive market collapse 
that ushered in the Depression. Given that the market crash was a.Ai 
aspect and important symbol of the overall economic breakdown, 
politicians and the public strongly believed that something needed to be 
done to regulate the exchanges. 115 In striking contrast, the problems of 
student-athletes and intercollegiate athletics, while significant, are not 
nearly so dire. Similarly, intercollegiate athletics involves large sums of 
money in absolute terms, but its economic significance pales in 
comparison with the New York Stock Exchange and the other exchanges. 
Second, the current political climate would be particularly hostile to 
a cal l to create a new agency or expand an existing one in order to force 
more effective NCAA action on issues of concern to student-athletes. 
One obvious candidate for expansion to encompass securities-style 
regulation of the NCAA, for instance, is the Department of Education, 
given the concern that NCAA decisionmakers and universities place a 
greater premium on educational objectives. Yet the Department of 
Education is one of the agencies most frequently mentioned as a candidate 
for elimination in the effort to downsize the federal government. 116 
Nevertheless, securities-style regulation cannot simply be dismissed . 
As we have seen, this approach offers striking benefits. Whereas the 
NCAA currently tends to make changes only in the face of adverse public 
opinion or congressional hearings, securities-style regulation would create 
115. My thanks to Alice Abreu for emphasizi:1g this point. See SELIGMAN, supra 
note 45, at ix, 75, 92. Passage was further smoothed by the Pecora he<1rings, which 
highlighted alleged abuses in the banking industry. ld. at 1-3g. 
116. From a slightly different persp<'"...ctive, these observations can be seen as 
aspxts of a historical path dependence issue. Having left the primary regulation of 
NCAA athletics to the private sphere for so long, Congress is less W(e!y to shift ge<1rs 
now, and to establish extensive governmental oversight of intercollegiate athletics. 
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a more systematic incentive to address concerns about l\ICAA regulation. 
An amateur athletics commission might play this role with respect to both 
the NCAA and other amateur athletics organizations. Such a step would 
be dramatic, but given the problems not only with the NCAA but with 
American sports generally, it is not unimaginabl e. 
It is interesting to note in this regard that there is a recurring threat 
that one or more major conferences might secede from the NCAA rather 
than continue to subject their programs to its restrictions. And it is 
debatable how necessary the NCAA real ly is, given the widely divergent 
perspectives of its members and how far it has moved from its original 
purposes in the context of revenue-producing sports . In view of this, it 
is certainly possible that the NCAA's member institutions will eventually 
agree to external review as the price of its continued existence, or that 
secession will prompt a call for at least limited securities-style regulation. 
V. CONCLUSlOl"l 
As a purely conceptual matter, securities-style regulation is in some 
respects the most attractive of the corporate and securities law approaches 
this Article has considered. Securities-style regulators could oversee the 
NCAA and its member institutions on an ongoing basis, and as a result 
both strike down unnecessarily anticompetitive NCAA rules, and force the 
NCAA to focus more closely on educational and other concerns of 
student-athletes . Because this approach would require a major shift in 
oversight, however, its implementation faces significant practical obstacles 
under current conditions. 
By contrast, the internal corporate governance devices, direct 
representation of and fiduciary duty litigation by student-athletes, both 
would have a less dramatic effect. Yet each is quite plausible as a 
practical matter, and the NCAA already appears to be moving toward 
some form of direct representation. Of the two approaches, fiduciary 
duty claims seem particularly promising. While fiduciary duty litigation 
is subject to several possible limitations, and is not a cure-all for the 
concerns of student-athletes, it offers appreciable advantages over existing 
constitutional law approaches, as well as over somewhat similar causes of 
action such as contract-based arguments and antitrust scrutiny. Not only 
might it result in an articulation of t--ICAA and member institutions' 
obligations to student-athletes, but it also could be used to scrutinize the 
process pursuant to which NCAA and member institution decisionmakers 
act. Student-athletes' abil ity to obtain lawyers to pursue fiduciary duty 
claims would be significantly enhanced if Congress were to pass 
legislation giving attorneys fees to successful plaintiffs; but even in the 
absence of such legislation, a number of student-athletes could, and 
should, add this approach to their existing strategies. 
